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COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET. By Sir Leon Brittan. Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limit-
ed, 1991. Pp. xi, 56.
Wayne D. Collins t
Sir Leon Brittan, the primary force today in European Community competi-
tion policy, serves as a vice-president of the European Commission and as the
commissioner charged with overseeing financial institutions and competition
matters. Nominated to the Commission in 1986 by the United Kingdom after
service as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Home Secretary, and Trade and
Industry Secretary, Brittan rapidly became a major voice in and for the Com-
munity. In the Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, delivered at Cambridge
University in February 1990 and now published,' Brittan addresses two
important aspects of Community competition policy: the assertion of antitrust
jurisdiction over acts beyond the territorial boundaries of the Community, and
the antitrust regulation of mergers and acquisitions within the Community.
The lecture on European Community jurisdiction speaks to the emerging
"foreign policy" of the single European market. The address is noteworthy if
only for its concise description of the evolution of the law of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the European Court of Justice through the Wood Pulp decision.'
Much more important, however, is the insight Brittan provides into the institu-
tional tension between the Commission and the Court. While since 1969 the
,Commission has employed the "effects doctrine" to reach actors outside the
Community whose acts have an impact within it, the Court has used narrow,
if sometimes strained, factual findings to assert jurisdiction on the basis of
presence within the Community. Brittan makes clear that the Court has never
rejected the effects doctrine, that the Commission remains free to employ it,
and that the Commission will do so in future cases. Because the Commission
continues to scrutinize foreign business activities, he predicts that the Court
eventually will have to confront the "hard case" where it must definitively
accept or reject the effects doctrine.
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of Columbia Bars; visiting lecturer, Yale Law School, 1991. Special Assistant to Vice President George
Bush and Deputy Counsel to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 1981-1982; Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice, 1983.
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Brittan's first lecture seems much like a brief to the Court, urging approval
of the effects doctrine (to extend the broadest jurisdiction over anticompetitive
activities adversely affecting the Common Market), as well as a promise by
the Commission to exercise discretion and not abuse this power to the detri-
ment of the Community's overall domestic and foreign policy interests. After
first reviewing in Part I some necessary background on the history of the single
European market, Community competition law, and the structure of Communi-
ty policymaking, I examine in Part II the argument implicit in Brittan's lecture
that the effects doctrine should be explicitly recognized as the governing
principle of Community competition law.
Brittan's second lecture focuses on the "domestic policy" of merger control.
In 1989, after years of urging by the Commission, the Council of Ministers
approved new legislation introducing Community-wide merger control.'
Brittan, who played a significant role in the adoption of the Merger Regulation,
devotes much of his second lecture to explaining some of the law's intricacies,
by no means a trivial task. This explanation, given soon after the Council's
action and six months before the regulation's effective date, was of the utmost
importance at the time for its insight into how the Commission might imple-
ment the regulation. While Brittan's lecture remains a good short introduction
to the subject, it necessarily lacks detail. Moreover, at the time the lectures
were given, Brittan could only speculate as to how the Merger Regulation
would perform in operation. In Part I I assess merger control in the Commu-
nity. I also consider the subtext of Brittan's treatment: the almost overt attempt
to continue to sell the Merger Regulation to the Community even after the
law's adoption and to minimize the enormous political differences among
member states requiring compromise before the Council could approve the
measure. Brittan's lecture reminds us of the difficulties faced by the Communi-
ty in fashioning a coherent domestic competition policy.
A theme connecting the two seemingly disparate lectures is Brittan's call
for international harmonization of competition law. The assertion of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction by its very nature is likely to impinge upon the interests of
foreign sovereign states, and, in a world of multinational conglomerates, even
ostensibly domestic merger control can have a substantial impact outside a
jurisdiction. The experience of the United States portends some of the tensions
likely to arise as the Community continues to extend its prescriptive jurisdic-
tion to activities outside the Common Market and as its merger control impedes
or blocks transactions involving companies with only minimal contact with
Europe. In Part IV of this essay I examine Brittan's call for international
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harmonization of competition law and explore some of the hurdles that stand
in the way.
I. THE SINGLE MARKET, COMPETITION LAW, AND COMMUNITY
POLICYMAKING
Upon the signing in 1957 of the European Economic Community (EEC)
Treaty (Treaty of Rome),4 six Western European states-France, Germany,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg-sought to create a common
market by 1970. Although the original countries were successful in eliminating
internal tariff barriers and in establishing a common external tariff by the late
1960s, national markets remained distinct through non-tariff barriers and the
lack of a common currency. The incentives for further market consolidation
were dulled by virtually uninterrupted economic growth and low inflation in
the late 1950s and 1960s, which left Europeans complacent with their small,
protected national markets.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, Europe steadily lost its ability to compete
both internationally and at home, first with the United States and then with
Japan. Instead of emulating their international competitors and organizing along
transnational lines, however, European businesses and governments turned
their attention inward through a series of defensive national mergers and the
creation of "national champions," new national non-tariff trade barriers, and
increased state aid to local industry. The downward spiral in competitiveness
continued, particularly in the high-technology sectors, while inflation and
unemployment rose and productivity stagnated.
A fundamental problem in the European economy was that the increasingly
isolated national markets were not large enough to permit industry to take
advantage of economies of scale in production or distribution, or to support
competitive research and development programs. Although the Treaty of Rome
had given the Community a lawmaking capacity that could have been used to
temper the member states' reemerging national economic protectionism and
to facilitate a larger, more efficient single market, as a political matter the
Community institutions were paralyzed. New single-market legislation, includ-
ing regulations and directives necessary to harmonize the national laws of
member states, required unanimity in the Council, the Community's ultimate
lawmaking body. By design the Council, which consists of one delegate from
each member state, is the body where the self-interests of the member states
find their most direct expression. In the economic turmoil of the times, the
willingness of member states to compromise and reach agreement in the
Council became exhausted by efforts to resolve budget disagreements, deal
4. TREATY ESTABLIS-mN THE EuRoPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY].
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with the increasingly expensive common agricultural policy, and negotiate the
enlargement of the Community to include the United Kingdom, Denmark, and
Ireland in 1973, Greece in 1981, and finally Spain and Portugal in 1986. The
common will simply did not exist to dispense with national protectionism and
promote a common market.
The Community reversed course in the mid-1980s. In June 1985, the
Commission, the Community's executive arm, issued its famous White Paper,
Completing the Internal Market, proposing roughly 300 measures (later pared
to 279) to abolish physical, regulatory, tax, and other non-tariff barriers along
national borders and create a single market by 1992.5 The Commission, a
body of seventeen members appointed by the member states,6 is designed to
be a "supranational" institution intended to represent the Community's interests
and to promote further integration of the member states. 7 The Commission's
White Paper, while perhaps a dramatic example, was very much in keeping
with its institutional purpose. Within a year, "Project 1992" received the
imprimatur of the member states through ratification of the Single European
Act (SEA).' The SEA set a deadline of December 31, 1992, for the comple-
tion of the internal market, which the Act defined as "an area without internal
frontiers. " The SEA also loosened the requirement of unanimity in the Coun-
cil, particularly with respect to Community legislation necessary to harmonize
municipal law on single market issues.1" By the end of 1991, the Council had
adopted 213 of the Commission's single market proposals. Also by the end of
1991, market integration had advanced to the point where the member states,
in the Treaty of Maastricht, could look beyond an internal market defined
merely by the absence of trade barriers and create the framework for an
Economic and Monetary Union with a single currency, to be in place by the
beginning of 1999.
5. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
COM(85)310 final.
6. Commissioners must be nationals of a member state, and the Commission must include at least one
but no more than two nationals from each member state. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single
Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 5, 1965, art. 10(1), 1967 O.J. (152) 2. Although commis-
sioners are appointed by the common accord of the member states, id. art. 11, in practice the five largest
member states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) each have two nationals on the
Commission and the others one each.
7. Commissioners are required to act "in the general interest of the Communities," to be completely
independent in the performance of their duties, and neither to seek nor to take instructions from any national
government. Member states have agreed not to seek to influence commissioners in the performance of their
duties. Id. art. 10(2).
8. Single European Act of February 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 7 (effective July 1, 1987).
9. EEC TREATY art. 8a (as amended 1987).
10. See Single European Act, supra note 8, arts. 7, 14, 18. The changes in voting introduced by the
Single European Act are somewhat byzantine. For a discussion, see T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIoNs
OF EtmoPEAN COMMJNrrY LAW 30-45 (2d ed. 1988). The climate of Council decisionmaking has changed
with the passage of the Single European Act. Unanimity today results more from compromise made to avoid
the adoption of legislation by something less than an unanimous vote than from compromise made to avoid
the threat of a veto.
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A single market requires a single competition policy, or at least a comped-
tion policy to deal with trans-Community activities. Cartels of nationally-based
firms can divide and allocate markets within the Community much like protec-
tionist government policies, and monopolists and other "dominant firms" can
disrupt a common market by organizing their distribution systems along
national lines to separate markets and to price discriminate. The Framers of
the Community foresaw these problems, and in the Treaty of Rome charged
the Community with "the institution of a system ensuring that competition in
the common market is not distorted."" Another, perhaps even more impor-
tant, goal for the Community is the elimination of measures that restrict the
import and export of goods between member states." Competition policy is
an essential instrument in promoting both economic integration and an efficient
allocation of resources.' 3
Two provisions contain the Treaty's generally applicable substantive
competition standards. Article 85(1) prohibits "as incompatible with the
common market" agreements and other concerted practices among two or more
independent undertakings (a broad Community concept which includes firms,
partnerships, company groups, and other commercial enterprises operating as
single business units) that may affect trade between member states and seek
the "prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market. "1 Provisions in contracts that violate Article 85 are void automatical-
ly, thus national courts of member states cannot order their performance.' 5
Article 85 specifically prohibits price-fixing, output limitations, divisions of
markets, price discrimination, and non-price vertical restraints (such as territo-
rial or customer limitations or exclusivity arrangements) not reasonably
necessary to the legitimate commercial object of the contract, although these
examples by no means are intended to be exhaustive.
Article 86 speaks to action, unilateral or otherwise, on the part of undertak-
ings with a "dominant position" within all or a part of the Common Market.
It prohibits, again as incompatible with the Common Market, "abuses" of this
dominant position to the extent the abuse may affect trade between member
states.'6 A dominant position usually exists when a firm achieves a forty-
percent market share, although the Commission contends that dominance can
11. EEC TREATY art. 3(f.
12. Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome declares as the first activity of the Community "the elimination,
as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation
and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect." Id. art. 3(a).
13. See COMMISsIONOFTHEEuROPEANCOMMUNTIES, TWENTIETHREPORTON COMPETITIONPOLICY
11 (1991) [hereinafter TWENTIETH REPORT].
14. EEC TREATY art. 85(1).
15. Id. art. 85(2); see also Case 37/79, Marty v. Lauder, 1980 E.C.R. 2481.
16. EEC TREATY art. 86.
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be found as to firms with shares as low as twenty percent.'7 Article 86 gives
as examples of dominant firm abuses the imposition of "unfair purchase or
selling prices," limitations on production, markets, or technical development
"to the prejudice of consumers," and the price discrimination and non-price
vertical restraints of the type prohibited by Article 85. Significantly, Article
85(3) grants exemptions from the prohibition of Article 85(1) for a concerted
practice that satisfies four requirements: the practice 1) must improve the
production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress;
2) must allow consumers a "fair share" of the resulting benefit; 3) must not
impose restrictions other than those indispensable in attaining the activity's
legitimate objectives; and 4) must not eliminate competition in a substantial
part of the affected market.'" In contrast, Article 86 authorizes no such ex-
emptions. 19
The language of Articles 85 and 86, like the substantive provisions of the
Sherman Act in the United States, is almost constitution-like in quality.
Interpretation, not textual directive, determines the boundaries between lawful
and unlawful business conduct. A variety of Community and national institu-
tions are involved in the application, and consequently the interpretation, of
Community competition law. The Council makes the final decision on most
EC legislation, including regulations and directives to detail and substantiate
the Treaty's competition provisions. 0 The Court of Justice and, below it, the
new Court of First Instance are the judicial arbiters of the law's construc-
tion.2 National legislatures, courts, and enforcement authorities are obligated
17. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNmEs, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLIcY 103
(1981).
18. EEC TRATY art. 85(3).
19. Id. Although Articles 85 and 86 may resemble sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988), there are distinct and important differences. Section 1, which makes unlawful every
.contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce,' has been strictly interpreted
by the Supreme Court to prohibit all concerted practices that adversely affect competition, even if the
practice may promote some other societal non-competition interest. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Article 85, by contrast, employs a more encompassing notion of
anticompetitive effect, particularly in the area of vertical restraints, but also provides for administratively
conferred exemptions on both competition and non-competition grounds (e.g., economic progress, exports,
or employment). Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization,
and conspiracy to monopolize, reaches unilateral action designed to create or augment unilateral market
power, while Article 86 is concerned only with abuses of a preexisting dominant position, not the creation
of the dominant position in the first instance. Where Article 86 applies, however, it has a broader reach
than section 2. For example, Article 86, by its terms, makes "unfair" pricing by a dominant firm an
actionable abuse, whereas the Supreme Court has never construed the Sherman Act to make a level of
pricing unlawful.
20. EEC TREATY art. 87(2)(e).
21. Members of the courts includejudges, possessing ultimate authority of adjudication, and advocates
general, who act as independent advisors and publish detailed analyses and recommendations as to the dis-
position of pending cases. Since the Court of Justice does not publish dissenting or individual statements
of judges, the opinions of the advocates general are often read against the Court's opinion for insight into
which issues may have been close or disputed.
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to act consistently with Community competition law, and to apply Community
competition law within their respective jurisdictions.'
The single most important Community antitrust institution, however, is the
Commission, which serves as the Community's law enforcement arm. Like
the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, the Commission has broad
powers to conduct antitrust investigations, find violations of Community
competition law, terminate infringements by way of injunction, and punish
violators by imposing fines.' In addition, the Commission has the exclusive
power to grant individual exemptions under Article 85(3), to fashion so-called
"block exemptions" that exempt categories of conduct from Article 85 pursuant
to Council-enacted enabling legislation, and to certify through nonbinding
"negative clearances" that notified conduct does not violate either Article 85
or Article 86. The Commission undertakes its fact-finding, prepares its draft
decisions, and formulates its competition policy proposals in Directorate
General ("DG") IV, one of twenty specialized departments in the Commiss-
ion's secretariat. The Commission, through its Legal Service, also reviews the
form of its decisions and proposals and defends its actions in Community
courts. Parties to whom a Commission decision is addressed and others to
whom it is of direct and individual concern may appeal to the Court of First
Instance and ultimately the Court of Justice, which may review the decision
for lack of jurisdiction, failure to observe any essential procedural requirement,
or infringement of the Treaty of Rome or its implementing regulations.24
Each of the Commission's directorates general reports to a designated
commissioner. Sir Leon Brittan is the commissioner with oversight responsibil-
ity for DG IV. Naturally, the career staff of DG IV is attentive to Brittan's
policies and predilections when allocating its limited enforcement resources,
exercising its investigative and prosecutorial discretion, and formulating
competition policy proposals, just as the staff of the Federal Trade Commission
is attentive to its chairman. At the Commission table, Brittan is responsible
for advancing competition policy initiatives and ensuring that any relevant
competition policy considerations are taken into account in Commission
decisions, regardless of the subject matter. Indeed, the Commission has
delegated to Brittan as the competition commissioner the authority to act in the
Commission's name in a variety of matters. His is a voice to be carefully
regarded whenever he speaks on competition policy. This is particularly true
when he makes a major address, as he did in the Lauterpacht Lectures.
22. To ensure that national courts in different member states apply Community law uniformly, Article
177 of the Treaty of Rome requires that national courts bring before the Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling any issue regarding the construction of any Treaty provision, including Articles 85 and 86. EEC
TREATY art. 177.
23. Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 O.J. (13) 204.
24. EEC TREATY art. 173.
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With this as background, we may turn to Brittan's first topic, the extraterri-
torial jurisdiction of the Community's competition laws.
I1. THE "FOREIGN POLICY" OF COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW
In a world economy, business conducted in one country may have substan-
tial effects in another country. If the affected country regards these effects as
detrimental to its interests, what recourse does it have? If the conduct is illegal
in the host country, the affected country may be able to obtain redress under
the host country's laws. Even if the conduct is not illegal, the affected country
may appeal to the good graces of the host country for assistance in eliminating
the source of the harmful effects. But what if the conduct is not illegal in the
host country or if the remedies available are inadequate in the view of the
affected country, and the host country is unable or unwilling to intervene to
the affected country's satisfaction? Can the affected country prescribe stan-
dards, that is, exercise prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the extraterritorial
conduct of the actors so as to halt the undesirable domestic effects?
The exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, to regulate extraterritorial con-
duct-usually called extraterritorial jurisdiction-solely on the basis of that
conduct's domestic effects is known in antitrust law as the "effects doctrine"
and more generally in international law as the objective territorial principle.
This doctrine has been largely developed and most aggressively employed by
the United States, although other countries, including Germany and Japan,
subscribe to the doctrine in one form or another.' These countries contend
that their exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the effects doctrine is
essential to protect their markets from anticompetitive schemes (especially
price-fixing and world market divisions) formulated abroad.
The effects doctrine is usually traced to the 1945 decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
(ALCOA).' ALCOA resulted from one of a number of investigations and
prosecutions commenced by the Justice Department beginning in the mid-1930s
against private international cartels.27 In 1937, the U.S. Department of Justice
25. For a review of European country practices, see Kurt Stockmann, Foreign Application ofEuropean
Antitrust Laws, in FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INST., ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND TlE EUROPEAN COMMUNiTY 251 (1986).
26. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Although at the time appeals from trial court judgments in antitrust
cases were made directly to the Supreme Court, in ALCOA the Court lacked a quorum of six justices who
had not at some point in their careers represented one of the parties. To permit an appeal, Congress passed
special legislation to certify the case to a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit as the court of last resort.
The panel hearing the appeal consisted of Chief Judge Learned Hand and Judges Thomas W. Swan and
Augustus Hand.
27. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953) (incandescent
lamps); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (explosives); United
States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (tungsten carbide); United States v. National
Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (titanium pigments), af'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States
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brought a civil action charging, among other things, that Aluminum Limited
(Limited), a Canadian corporation created by ALCOA to take over its non-
U.S. interests and spun off to ALCOA's shareholders in 1928, conspired with
several European companies through a Swiss-based cartel to limit their exports
of aluminum to the United States as well as to other parts of the world. The
trial court found that Limited did not operate in the United States either
directly or through agents and that it was independent of any U.S. company
(including ALCOA), and dismissed Limited from the case for lack ofjurisdic-
tion. The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge Learned Hand, reinstat-
ed the charge. Although Judge Hand agreed that jurisdiction could not be based
on any theory that Limited was present in the United States, in a radical
departure from prior case law he held that jurisdiction nonetheless existed since
Limited's conduct had adverse effects in the United States: "[1]t is settled
law-as "Limited" itself agrees-that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends .... ,2 Judge
Hand viewed the question solely as one of domestic law and statutory construc-
tion. He held that Limited was subject to U.S. antitrust jurisdiction because
of its participation in the foreign cartel, since that cartel intended to limit
exports to the United States from abroad and since it could be inferred from
this intent that the cartel in fact adversely affected U.S. import trade.'
The effects doctrine continues to be cited by U.S. courts as defining the
outer boundaries of antitrust jurisdiction, although some courts have used their
discretion as an independent branch of government not to employ the doctrine
to its full extent in given cases." Even when courts do not act, however, the
v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (dyes).
28. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at443. Prior to ALCOA, U.S. courts consistently followed the rule, originally
articulated in 1909 by Justice Holmes, that "all legislation is primafacie territorial" and consequently that
the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdiction was confined to activities occurring within the borders of the
United States. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). One of the more
puzzling questions in the history of extraterritorialjurisdiction is why Limited agreed to the Second Circuit's
rendition of "settled law."
29. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 444. Technically, the court held that a rebuttable presumption of effect on
cdmmerce arose upon a showing of intent to depress U.S. import trade and the adoption of cartel policies
designed to effectuate this intent. Limited failed to rebut this presumption; therefore, no affirmative showing
of effect was required. Significantly, the Second Circuit assumed in dictum that Congress did not intend
the Sherman Act to reach extraterritorial agreements not intended to affect the United States. Id. at 443.
The requirement of intent as well as effect is known as the "intended effects" doctrine, and it provides a
sufficient but not necessary test for extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax
Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1292 (3d Cir. 1979); Conservation Council of W. Austi., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp.
270, 275 (W.D. Pa. 1981). The majority of U.S. courts today find either an actual effect or an intent to
affect adequate as the basis for jurisdiction.
30. Some cases explicitly have recognized the distinction between the power and thejudicial discretion
to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980);
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1296; Conservation Council, 518 F. Supp. at 275. Other cases are silent
on the distinction but require some consideration of foreign interests, either by a balancing test or by a
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effects doctrine has provided the jurisdictional authority for U.S. antitrust
enforcement agencies to open grand jury investigations into extraterritorial
business conduct, and for private plaintiffs to pursue treble damage actions
(with their typically enormous pretrial discovery) against such conduct.31
Other countries, especially the United Kingdom, denounce the effects
doctrine as an affront to their sovereignty. The basis for this view is the strict
territorial principle, perhaps best enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in The
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden:32
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and
absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty,
to the same extent, in that power which could impose such restriction. All excep-
tions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation, within its own territo-
ries, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no
other legitimate source.33
While some of these countries also recognize the objective territorial principle
where the conduct in question is more universally condemned-for example,
the firing of a bullet across international borders-they reject any extension
of the doctrine to commercial activities which are common and lawful, if not
encouraged, in much of the world. The countries brand efforts to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over commercial activities as "economic imperial-
ism" and have responded with diplomatic protests, amicus briefs urging
dismissal of pending cases,34 refusals to assist foreign discovery, s injunc-
tions against their nationals prosecuting antitrust actions in a foreign forum,36
restrictions on giving evidence in foreign proceedings 7 and on complying
"jurisdictional rule of reason." See, e.g., Montreal Trading, 661 F.2d at 869; Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
31. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS § 4.0 (1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109, at 20,610.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
33. Id. at 136; accord, The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824) ("The laws of no nation
can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens. They can have no
force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdiction."). A similar
formulation was adopted in the Lotus case before the Permanent Court of International Justice. S.S. Lotus(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) ("Now the first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law is... that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it [a
State] may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.").
34. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980) (Canada, Australia,
South Africa, and United Kingdom as amici curiae; France filed memorandum with court through U.S.
Department of State).
35. See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547 (appeal taken
from C.A.).
36. See, e.g., British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] 1 Q.B. 142 (C.A. 1983) (enjoining Laker
from proceeding against British airlines in U.S. antitrust action), rev'd, 1985 App. Cas. 58 (1984).
37. A number of countries have enacted so-called "blocking" legislation to prohibit or limit compliance
with foreign discovery requests. Many of these statutes were passed in the aftermath of specific antitrust
investigations or proceedings under U.S. law. For example, the Netherlands statute followed the 1952 world
petroleum investigation. The United Kingdom and Germany first enacted blocking statutes in response to
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with judicial orders in the affected country's proceedings, 3' refusals to recog-
nize or enforce remedies awarded in foreign civil antitrust litigation, 39 and
even enactment of "claw back" legislation to permit nationals to recover in
domestic courts some of the damages paid as a result of a foreign antitrust
judgment.'
The uranium cartel litigation dramatically illustrates this tension. To protect
its domestic industry in the face of excess world supply, the United States in
1964 imposed an embargo on imports of uranium for use in nuclear power
plants. This action closed over two-thirds of the world market to foreign
producers. In response (and with the encouragement of their respective govern-
ments) uranium producers from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, South
Africa, and France entered into a marketing agreement to fix minimum prices
and allocate the remaining markets in the world. In the early 1970s, the
situation reversed, with demand outstripping supply. Between 1973 and 1976,
the price of uranium increased seven-fold. Although the United States had
lifted the embargo, Westinghouse, which had built many of the domestic
nuclear power plants and was under long-term contracts to keep them supplied
with uranium fuel, was economically unable to keep its supply commitments.
A number of utilities sued Westinghouse in Virginia for $2 billion for breach
of contract. Westinghouse defended in part on the grounds of commercial
impracticability, alleging that the original marketing agreement had evolved
the 1960 ocean shipping grand jury investigation. Australia, Canada, and South Africa passed their statutes
(and Britain revised its statute) in reaction to the private litigation and government grand jury investigation
in the late 1970s and early 1980s into the international uranium cartel. See 1-B BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 718-36 (1985 &
supp. 1991). Much of this legislation is examined in Deborah A. Sabalot, Note, Shortening the Long Arm
ofAmerican Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 LoY. L. REv.
213 (1982). See also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, OBTAINING DiscovERY ABROAD (1990).
38. See, e.g., British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 1953 Ch. 19 (1952)
(restraining ICI, British company, from complying with antitrust decree issued in United States v. Imperial
Chem. Indus. Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), which required compulsory licensing of British
patents), aff'd, 1955 Ch. 37 (1954) (finding that savings clause in U.S. judgment did not require ICI to
grant licenses on patents that it already exclusively licensed to BNS).
39. E.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11 (Eng.); Foreign Proceedings (Excess of
Jurisdiction) Act of 1984, 1984 AUSTL. ACTS P., No. 3 (Austl.); Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
of 1984, R.S.C., ch. F-29, § 1 (1984) (Can.).
40. A scholarly counterpart to this international debate rages in the academic literature. Hundreds of
articles, not to mention a few books, have been written on the subject. For a small sampling of the literature
see 1 HAWK, supra note 37, at ch. 2 (1985 & supp. 1991); DIETER LA&GE & GARY BORN, THE EXTRATER-
RITORIAL APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAWS (1987); A.V. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN
ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (1983); A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AND NATIONALJURISDICTION (1988); J.E. Ferry, Towards Completing the Charm.i The Woodpulp
Judgment, 1989 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 19; Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 579 (1983); Karl M. Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary
InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783 (1984); Douglas E. Rosenthal, Jurisdictional ConflictsBetween
Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487 (1985); Walter Van Gerven, EC Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters:
the Wood Pulp Judgment, in 1989 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INST., 1992 AND EEC/U.S. COMPErTITON
AND TRADE LAW 451 (1990). For all of the ink spilled, the only clear conclusion to emerge is that there
is no agreement on a generally applicable rule or even a common analytical approach to the question.
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into a worldwide cartel and that the price increases in uranium that made
performance impa6ticable were the result of this cartel's price-fixing endeav-
ors. Westinghouse also commenced its own treble-damage antitrust action in
Illinois against the alleged cartel's members. At about the same time, the
Department of Justice opened a grand jury investigation of the alleged uranium
cartel. Westinghouse's antitrust action ultimately settled, but only after the
uranium producers refused to appear, their governments' efforts to have the
case dismissed as beyond U.S. jurisdiction were rejected, and a default judg-
ment was issued against them.4 1
The contract action also significantly contributed to the international
dispute. In order to obtain discovery from Rio Tinto Zinc and its officers in
Great Britain, Westinghouse had obtained letters rogatory from the Virginia
court. The Justice Department subsequently intervened in this discovery effort
to obtain additional information for its grand jury investigation. In a celebrated
decision, the House of Lords refused to enforce the letters rogatory, deferring
to the British Government's view that the U.S. actions infringed upon British
sovereignty.42 Moreover, Canada, Australia, and South Africa enacted legisla-
tion prohibiting their nationals from complying with discovery requests in the
uranium litigation.43 Finally, although the Justice Department ultimately ended
its grand jury investigation without action, the fact that the foreign producers
were being pursued as targets in criminal proceedings in the United States for
actions encouraged by their governments further infuriated these countries.
Although the effects doctrine has been in issue in several Community
competition cases, it has never been considered essential by the Commission
or recognized as part of Community law by the European Court of Justice. In
the seminal Dyestuffs case,' decided before the United Kingdom became part
of the Community, the Commission employed the effects doctrine as a second-
ary ground to extend jurisdiction over one British and two Swiss companies
that were part of a conspiracy to fix the prices of aniline dyes sold in the
Community. The Commission found the foreign. companies' commercial
relationship with the Community concerning the sale of dyes, the effect that
41. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'g 473 F. Supp. 382
(N.D. II. 1979) (entering default); see also United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231
(N.M. 1980) (entering default judgment in state antitrust action), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451
U.S. 901 (1981).
42. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 App. Cas. 547 (appeal taken from C.A.).
43. Uranium Information Security Regulations, 110 C. Gaz., pt. II, No. 19 (1976), repealed and
replacedby Uranium Information Security Regulations, 111 C. Gaz., pt. 11, No. 20 (1977) (Can.); Foreign
Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act of 1976, 1976 Austl. Acts, No. 121, amended by 1976
AustI. Acts, No. 202, repealed and replaced by Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act of 1984,
1984 AusL. ACTS P., No. 3 (Austl.).
44. Commission Decision 69/243/EEC (Dyestuffs), 1969 O.J. (L 195) 11, 1969 C.M.L.R. D23, on
appeal, Case 48/69, Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 619, 1972 C.M.L.R. 557;
see also Case 52169, J.R. Geigy AG v. Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 787; Case 53/69, Sandoz AG v.
Commission, 1972 E.C.R. 845.
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the price-fixing arrangement had on the Community, and the essential interest
of the Community in protecting itself against price-fixing to be sufficient under
international law to invoke the effects doctrine and permit the Community to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Commission's primary argument,
however, was that the foreign parent companies gave instructions to their
subsidiaries in the Community to increase dye prices in furtherance of the
illegal concerted practice, and that this active influence constituted conduct
within the Community. On appeal, although the Advocate General endorsed
the Commission's approach, the Court of Justice-perhaps moved by a strongly
worded Aide-Mgmoire presented by the British Government-resisted so broad
a holding. The Court held that where, as here, a subsidiary in the Community
does not enjoy true autonomy in its commercial actions and instead acts at the
direction of its parent to increase prices, the identities of the parent and
subsidiary merge into a single "undertaking" within the meaning of Article 85,
so that jurisdiction existed over the parent by virtue of the controlled
subsidiary's presence in the Community.4' This "merging of identities" has
become known as the "economic entity" doctrine.'
In the 1985 Aluminum Imports case the defendants sought to'put the effects
doctrine at issue.47 The Commission found that the foreign trade organizations
of the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German
Democratic Republic entered into an unlawful market-sharing conspiracy with
the major aluminum producers in Western Europe, whereby the Eastern
producers would not sell any aluminum into Europe except through Western
producers. The Eastern producers argued that the Commission lacked jurisdic-
tion, since they were not situated in the Community nor had they entered into
the market-sharing arrangement within the Community. The Commission
disagreed, finding that some of the Eastern producers controlled subsidiaries
in the Community and to this extent were subject to the Community's jurisdic-
tion under the economic entity doctrine articulated in Dyestuffs.4 The Com-
mission found that the other Eastern producers, although organized outside the
Community, traded aluminum pursuant to the agreement within the Common
Market, and so were subject to the Community's jurisdiction by virtue of their
45. Imperial Chem. Indus., 1972 E.C.R. at 662-63, 1972 C.M.L.R. at 628-29.
46. On the economic entity doctrine in the Community, see generally Case 170/83, Hydrotherm
Gerftebau GmbH v. Compact del Dott. Ing. Mario Andreoli & Co., 1984 E.C.R. 2999; Joined Cases 6
& 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 1 C.M.L.R. 309 (1974).
United States courts employ a counterpart to this doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of
Am., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo SpA, 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Ctr. Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); In re Siemens & Halske A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
47. Case 206185 (Aluminum Imports), Commission Decision of 19 December 1984 Relating to a
Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (Aluminum Imports from Eastern Europe), 1985 O.J. (L
92) 1.
48. Id. at 48.
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implied presence under the well-known Bdguelin doctrine.49 While the Eastern
producers may have tried to entice the Commission into relying on the effects
doctrine so as to better their chances on appeal, it is hard to see that the
Commission in fact employed the doctrine. The parties did not appeal the
decision.
Most recently, in the Wood Pulp case,50 the Commission arguably used
the effects doctrine-although not by name-to find jurisdiction over various
North American, Scandinavian, Portuguese, and Spanish wood pulp producers
involved in a conspiracy to fix the price of pulp sold in the Community. The
Commission found that the parties were either "exporting directly to or doing
business within the Community" during the period of infringement. 51 To the
extent that the parties had branches, subsidiaries, or agents operating within
the Community through which the defendants effected their prices, these
defendants were present by "doing business within the Community" under the
economic entity doctrine. The Commission exercised jurisdiction over those
defendants not covered by the economic entity doctrine by virtue of the fact
that they were "exporting directly to" the Community. To reach other parties
the Commission found that the concerted price-fixing arrangements, price data
exchanges, and export resale prohibitions all "concerned shipments made
directly to buyers in the Community or sales made in the EC to buyers there"
and that the effect of these practices on prices charged to customers within the
EC was "not only substantial but intended and was the primary and direct
result of the agreements and practices."52 To many, including Brittan, this
grounded jurisdiction in the effects doctrine, 3 but it seems more like the
implied-presence analysis articulated in Aluminum Imports.
On appeal, the Advocate General agreed that the effects doctrine should
be applied, provided that jurisdiction would be exercised only where there was
a "direct and immediate, reasonably foreseeable and substantial effect. " 4
However, the Commission adopted a more equivocal stance before the Court,
asserting that the effects doctrine did not correctly reflect the basis of the
Community's jurisdiction. Rather, the Commission argued, jurisdiction was
based on the implementation of the concerted practice in the Community, either
by directly trading in the Common Market or by using agents or sales offices
there. The Commission also observed that it was not strictly necessary for each
49. Id. In Beguelin, the Court held that a foreign manufacturer was present in the Community where
it sold its products to a Community distributor, and that this presence gave the Community antitrust
jurisdiction over the manufacturer to review the exclusive distribution agreement between the two parties.
Case 22/71, Bdguelin Import Co. v. SAGL Import-Export S.A., 1971 E.C.R. 949.
50. Case 89/85, A. Ahlstrdm Osakeyhti6 v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193,4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988).
51. Case 202/85, Commission Decision of19 December 1984 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty (Wood Pulp), 1985 O.J. (L 85) 1, 79.
52. l
53. See COMPWnTION PoLICY, supra note 1, at 10; Ferry, supra note 40, at 19.
54. A. AhIstrOm, 1988 E.C.R. at 5226, 4 C.M.L.R. at 931 (1988).
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of the parties to have an intermediary in the Community implementing its
practices; it was sufficient that some of the parties used intermediaries, since
the actions of those intermediaries in implementing the unlawful arrangement
were "attributable to all the undertakings engaged in the restrictive practices
concerned."55 Once again, the British government appeared as amicus curiae
to oppose adoption of the effects doctrine, and the Court found jurisdiction on
narrower grounds. Although only some of the defendants had subsidiaries or
branches in the Community, those that did not nonetheless implemented the
conspiracy in the Community by selling directly into it at conspiratorially set
prices. Implementation entails presence, so the Court again found no need to
resolve the question of the effects doctrine.
In the wake of Brittan's Lauterpacht Lectures, a renewed dispute has
appeared within the Community about the incorporation of the effects doctrine
into its law. Brittan cites Dyestuffs, Aluminum Imports, and Wood Pulp as
straightforward effects-doctrine cases, and clearly indicates that the Commis-
sion will continue to use the effects doctrine as the basis for extraterritorial
jurisdiction in the future. Implicit in Brittan's lecture is the argument that,
when the hard case arises where the Court will not be able to ground jurisdic-
tion on the economic entity doctrine of Dyestuffs, the implied presence doctrine
of BMguelin/Aluminum Imports, or the implementation doctrine of Wood Pulp,
the Court finally should recognize the effects doctrine, notwithstanding the
international political problems that the United States has faced in employing
the doctrine and the resistance that the United Kingdom undoubtedly will raise.
The underlying argument for recognition appears to have the following
elements: 1) Community law permits, if not compels, incorporation of the
effects doctrine; 2) the Community's self-interest requires the expansion of
existing doctrines of jurisdiction to include the effects doctrine in order to
reach the anticompetitive effects within the Community which the hard case
scenario assumes cannot otherwise be reached; 3) international law constrains
but does not prohibit use of the effects doctrine; and 4) the Commission will
use discretion in exercising jurisdiction under the effects doctrine so as to
maximize the overall interests of the Community, taking into account in any
given case not only the magnitude of the economic harms to be ameliorated
but also the political reaction of individual foreign states and the international
community as a whole. Given the potential political firestorm that attends the
effects doctrine, the craftsmanship of the logic, and the status of the author,
the argument deserves thoughtful attention. Upon analysis, however, Brittan's
case is not compelling.
The EC derives its powers through the consent of the member states, and
thus the Community's capacity to employ the effects doctrine in the first
55. Id. at 5205, 4 C.M.L.R. at 914 (1988).
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instance must find its source in the Community's enabling acts. Brittan looks
to Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome, which obliges the Community to ensure
that competition "in the common market" is not distorted, and the specific
provisions of Articles 85 and 86, which both, in Brittan's words, "require that
something should happen 'within the common market. ' '5 6 To Brittan these
provisions make the fundamental scope of Community competition law territo-
rial in nature. From this observation, Brittan implicitly concludes that Commu-
nity jurisdiction extends as far as international law permits under the territorial
principle.
This conclusion is not obvious. It is true that the Treaty provisions find
their basis in the territorial principle, but that does not necessarily mean they
reach as far as the effects doctrine. The provisions could equally be confined
to the strict territorial principle. Indeed, the plain language of Articles 85 and
86 is more consistent with the latter principle than with the former. First, the
articles require not only that "something" happen within the Common Market,
but also that the concerted practices or dominant firm abuses "affect trade
between Member States."57 Brittan gives this language short shrift, dismissing
it as engaging Community jurisdiction along with national jurisdiction for trade
among member states, but telling us nothing about trade across Community
borders. The language, however, appears analogous to the federal subject
matter jurisdiction predicate of interstate commerce in U.S. law, which is
distinct from the predicate of U.S. import or export commerce that is seeming-
ly required to permit application of the effects doctrine.5"
Second, while the "something" that must be "within the common market"
for Article 85 to apply is an actual or intended anticompetitive effect, the
"something" under Article 86 appears to be the dominant position of the
alleged violator, not the abuse. The reach of Article 85 to effects may be no
more than the closing of a loophole that otherwise would permit European
companies to escape liability by making the situs of their anticompetitive
agreements some non-Community country. Conversely, if Article 85 was
intended to include the effects doctrine, why did the language of Article 86
require the dominant firm itself and not the abuse (the counterpart of the effect
required under Article 85) to be within the Community? When all the provi-
sions are read together, the jurisdiction-enabling language appears to be more
"the effect on trade between member states" than something merely "occurring
within the Community." This conclusion is also consistent with the intent of
the original six member states in 1957 to create a customs union free of
internal tariff barriers.
56. COMPETmON POLICY, supra note 1, at 5.
57. EEC TREATY arts. 85, 86 (emphasis added).
58. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988) (exempting
from U.S. antitrust subject matter jurisdiction certain activities in U.S. export commerce).
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This challenge to Brittan's enabling argument may prove too much for
three reasons. First, the statutory reference to trade between member states
may have been intended only to exclude from Community jurisdiction activities
with local effects within a single member state, and not to exclude activities
in Community foreign commerce. Second, the Court of Justice has taken a
very expansive view of what it means to affect trade between member states:
the test is satisfied if the action is reasonably likely to have "an influence,
direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade among Member
States." 59 Under this test, for example, the Court has held that the interstate
trade requirement is satisfied by conduct that affects the structure of the market
(such as a refusal to deal') and by price-fixing of raw materials that do not
trade in interstate commerce but are used in the manufacture of products traded
among member states. 61 The conventional wisdom in the Community appears
to hold that, under this standard, an anticompetitive practice on the Com-
munity's import trade necessarily affects trade between member states.
Third, the EEC was never intended to be only a simple customs union. The
Treaty of Rome was also framed to have the Community represent and protect
the collective interests of the member states in international commercial affairs.
The Community seeks to establish a common external customs tariff and a
common commercial policy toward third-party countries.62 The Treaty ex-
pressly empowers the Community to enter into commercial treaties with third-
party countries on all aspects of the Community's common commercial policy,
including not only tariff and trade agreements but also export aid, credit and
finance, multilateral commodity agreements, and aid to third-world coun-
tries.63 More importantly, the Community under the Treaty has implied pow-
ers to engage in foreign relations necessary and appropriate to implement
accepted internal Community objectives.4 To the extent that extraterritorial
activities have anticompetitive effects that distort the Common Market, the
Community should have the capacity to employ the effects doctrine under the
Community's implied foreign relations powers, if not under the express
language of the Treaty's competition provisions.
59. Case 56/65, Socidtd Technique Mini re v. Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 249, 1966
C.M.L.R. 357, 375; see Joined Cases 56 & 58164, Consten v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299.
60. Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 294, 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 497-98
(1978); Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission (Commercial
Solvents), 1974 E.C.R. 223, 252-53, 1 C.M.L.R. 309, 341-42 (1974).
61. Case 136/86, Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac v. Aubert (BNIC II), 1987 E.C.R.
4789, 4814 (1988); Commercial Solvents, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 1 C.M.L.R. 309 (1974).
62. EEC TREATY art. 3(b).
63. Id. art. 113.
64. See, e.g., Opinion 1/76, Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741; Joined
Cases 3, 4 & 6/76, Kramer (North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention Case), 1976 E.C.R. 1279; Case
22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA Case), 1971 E.C.R. 263, 1971 C.M.L.R. 335.
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Assuming that the Community is empowered by the member states to
employ the effects doctrine, is it in the Community's interest to do so? What
if the actors cannot be found to be present in the Community through their
actual business dealings in a member state or through the alter ego of their
Community subsidiaries? Brittan confidently predicts that inevitably the truly
hard case will present itself when the Common Market suffers anticompetitive
harm from a foreign sales cartel whose members, for example: 1) make no
direct sales into the Common Market but deal only through independent
middlemen; or 2) divide world markets, with some members agreeing not to
export to the Common Market at all; or 3) allocate from abroad markets within
the Community, with each cartel member respecting the assigned territory of
the others; or 4) rig a market in some way by refusing to act within the
Common Market. Is not the effects doctrine, Brittan asks rhetorically, neces-
sary to reach these types of injurious conduct? Indeed, as long as the exercise
of jurisdiction is consistent with international law (a point to which we will
return shortly), doesn't the Treaty of Rome compel the use of the effects
doctrine against extraterritorial activities that distort competition within the
Common Market and affect trade between member states?
Brittan's point rests on the underlying argument that it is necessary to plug
jurisdictional holes where they exist and the effects doctrine is just the putty
with which to do the repair. Apart from aesthetics, however, plugging holes
is important only if they are below the waterline. As Brittan implicitly recog-
nizes, the examples he posits seldom if ever go below the water's surface.
Of the four hypotheticals, the first best presents the question. Can there
be implementation within the meaning of the Wood Pulp doctrine when cartel
members refuse to sell directly or indirectly in the Community, and the only
price-fixed goods that enter the Community are those imported by independent
middlemen? While it is hard to see how any implementation, and with it
meaningful presence, in the Community could be found on these facts, it is
equally hard to imagine them arising in practice. I am aware of no case where
the members of a foreign sales cartel could resist implementing their anti-
competitive scheme through subsidiaries or agents in the world's major mar-
kets. The temptation to profit from global price discrimination is simply too
great, and dealing through independent middlemen opens the door to arbitrage
in the secondary market. The hypothetical is a good one for a small market
in an isolated country; for a market the size of the Community, the scenario
is unrealistic.65
65. A similar analysis applies in the case of a foreign dominant cartel with a competitive fringe in
a world market. In this situation the cartel sets the world price, which the competitive fringe independently
follows. The regulating state, as part of the world market, is certainly harmed by the cartel's price-fixing
endeavors, even if only members of the competitive fringe sell into that state. As in the case of Brittan's
first hypothetical, however, it is unlikely that a cartel capable of setting prices in a world market would
choose on economic grounds to operate completely outside of the Community. The same result should
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The market allocation hypotheticals are more easily treated analytically.
To make the market allocation hypothetical applicable to the Common Market
(and not merely a boycott as in the fourth example), market allocations make
economic sense only when some cartel member has the "rights" to sell in the
Community. But the creation of these rights, and their subsequent observation,
are every bit as much of an implementation of the anticompetitive scheme as
selling into the Common Market at prices set conspiratorially. While cartel
members who do not have "rights" to sell in the Common Market may not
themselves be present directly in the Community through their own implement-
ing activities, it is a small step to recognize their presence, under the Bgue-
lin/Aluminum Imports doctrine, through the implementing activities of their co-
conspirators who do have such rights, under the theory that co-conspirators
are agents of one another when acting in furtherance of the conspiracy. The
Commission argued as much in Wood Pulp.
Finally, depending on the details, the failure-to-act hypothetical will have
the attributes of either the price-fixing example or the market allocation
example. If the failure to act is complete on the part of all conspiring partici-
pants, then the hypothetical is similar to the price-fixing scenario in that it is
analytically clean but unlikely to occur in practice. If the failure to act is not
complete-that is, if some of the co-conspirators do-something in the Commu-
nity (such as submit bids while others refrain)-then we are back to the market
allocation case, in which the agency theory of conspiracy can be used to
impute presence as a result of the implementing acts of co-conspirators.
Accordingly, if Brittan's examples reflect the types of anticompetitive
conduct that the Community wants to prohibit, a Commission victory in
persuading the Court of Justice to adopt the effects doctrine may be more
aesthetically pleasing than revolutionary. The Dyestuffs economic entity
doctrine, the Bdguelin/Aluminum Imports presence doctrine, and the Wood Pulp
implementation doctrine appear sufficient to reach not only Brittan's hypothe-
ticals but indeed almost all of the types of cases that have arisen.66 Given the
obtain with respect to foreign mergers capable of affecting world prices; for this reason concurrent merger
controljurisdiction presents some of the thorniest problems in the international harmonization of competition
law.
66. A possible exception to this proposition may be emerging in the case where foreign firms agree
among themselves (perhaps with the encouragement of their government) to purchase their requirements
only from their co-national suppliers, in effect boycotting exporters in other countries and causing
anticompetitive harm to their export trade. The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice recently
has expressed concern that the Japanese keiretsu (informal vertically integrated conglomerates) may be
operating in this manner, and it has indicated that it is studying the application of the effects doctrine to
reach such practices under U.S. antitrust law. See Antitrust Division May Use Sherman Act to Attack
Anticompetitive Conduct Abroad, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1461, at 554 (Apr. 12, 1990);
Keith Bradsher, U.S. Weighs Broadening of Antitrust, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1992, at D5. Of course, this
case may not be as interesting for the Community for a variety of reasons. First, such foreign boycotts
may not actionable under Article 85 for lack of the requisite effect on trade between states. Second, it is
difficult for a foreign boycott actually to distort competition in the Common Market. Third, boycotts
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hostile political reaction to the incorporation of the effects doctrine into
Community law-particularly from so important a Community member as the
United Kingdom-the price in hostility created may not be worth the result.67
On the third leg of his argument Brittan turns to the proposition that
international law constrains but does not prohibit the use of the effects doc-
trine. To Brittan, the Community as a creature of international law is bound
afortiori by that law's constraints. International law contains a number of
limiting principles designed to foster a peaceful political equilibrium in a world
where different states have conflicting interests concerning the same conduct.
Since states tend to be parochial with respect to affairs occurring within their
territorial boundaries and can view efforts by other countries to regulate those
affairs as an affront to their sovereignty, international law has evolved several
doctrines to balance these interests. Some of these principles, such as foreign
sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign sovereign compulsion, are
specific in the limitations they entail but narrow in their scope of application.
More generally applicable principles are harder to define and apply. The best
recognized of these principles is comity, about which the U.S. Supreme Court
made the following observation:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens or other persons who are under the
protection of its laws."
In other words, comity calls for restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction in cases
with a foreign element when foreign interests and laws may be implicated.69
A special species of comity may be the principle of noninterference, which
prohibits a state from applying its law if the regulatory interests it seeks to
generally have yet to attract much antitrust attention from the Commission. See LENNART RITER ET AL.,
EEC COMPETIION LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 164-65 (1991).
67. Another argument, not addressed by Brittan, contends that recognition by the Court of the effects
doctrine would be in the Community's interests even if it is not strictly necessary to reach extraterritorial
anticompetitive conduct. By employing the terminology .of implementation rather than effects, the Court
invites debate and litigation over when implementation is narrower than effect. Experience suggests that
enormous resources of both the Community and the defendants can be expended on these questions, and
to the extent that an outright acceptance of the effects doctrine could mitigate the incentives to dispute
jurisdiction, it may promote justice and efficiency. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, a significant
member of the Community, remains opposed to the effects doctrine, and any inefficiencies associated with
the Court's implementation formula may be a small price to pay for intra-Community agreement on a
practically effective rule of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
68. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
69. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (defining comity as "the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign
government not otherwise binding on this forum').
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advance are outweighed by the interests of a foreign state likely to be harmed
if jurisdiction is asserted and relief granted.7"
Brittan advances his political argument that the Court should accept the
effects doctrine by emphasizing the requirement that the Community obey
international law in its exercise of jurisdiction. Not only does he appeal to the
international law-abiding proclivities of his audience (including the Court), he
also seeks to distinguish the use of the effects doctrine by the Community from
that by the United States. Many believe the United States has not given due
regard to international law principles in its exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, and that its cavalier attitude has been the source of many of its troubles
in the area. To the extent that international law incorporates limitations on the
effects doctrine to balance conflicting state interests in a neutral manner, if
these limitations are observed the Community should not run afoul of world
sentiment as has the United States.
The argument is appealing at first glance, but exactly what limits does
international law impose on the exercise of territorial jurisdiction? International
law has its sources in international conventions, international custom as
evidenced by the practice of states, general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, and judiciai decisions and teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists. No treaties or other international conventions govern the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.7' The practice of states, as we saw
in the introduction to this section, varies widely, precluding any settled interna-
tional custom. Comity, noninterference, and other general principles of law,
all of which emphasize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality of
states, are poorly defined in practice and usually call for, some balancing of
interests on a scale of unknown measure. Judicial decisions and respected
commentary on the subject are a quagmire, although the weight of authority
strongly suggests that there is some limit on extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
upshot, as the International Court of Justice concluded in a related context in
the Barcelona Traction case, is that:
[l] ntemational law does not impose hard and fast rules on States delimiting spheres
of national jurisdiction ... but leaves to States a wide discretion in the matter. It
does however (a) postulate the existence of limits-though in any given case it may
be for the tribunal to indicate what these are for the purposes of that case; and (b)
involve for every State an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the
extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign element,
and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to,
or more appropriately exercisable by, another State.'
70. COMPTrITON POLIcY, supra note 1, at 15-16. On the principle of non-interference, see Meessen,
supra note 40.
71. Some international agreements, however, provide for consultation in international antitrust matters.
See infra notes 152-167 and accompanying text.
72. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd. (New Application: 1962) (Belg. v. Spain),
1970 I.C.J. 3, 105 (Feb. 5) (emphasis in original).
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This lack of definition in international-law principles places Brittan's
argument on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, if international law is
read restrictively to impose binding constraints on the exercise of extraterritori-
al jurisdiction, it may remove the very ability of the effects doctrine to reach
foreign actors and their conduct not already covered by the economic entity,
implied presence, and implementation doctrines, at least in the cases that are
empirically likely to arise. In Brittan's hypotheticals, the truly hard case
involves a foreign cartel whose members do not sell the supracompetitively
priced products directly or through agents in the Community; the products
which find their way into the Common Market get there through independent
middlemen. Can the effects doctrine reach this conduct where the implementa-
tion doctrine cannot? The cartel's conduct is included within the specific
examples given in Article 85 of concerted practices that are prohibited, and
presumably the Common Market suffers the requisite distortion of competition
when the price-fixed goods are sold to Community customers. We may
therefore assume that some "effect" is present, but will international law permit
the effects doctrine to reach the foreign cartel members? Under most modern
interpretations, including that of Brittan, international law demands at a
minimum that the effect be "direct and immediate, reasonably foreseeable and
substantial"'3 in order to give the prosecuting state a sufficient interest to
justify regulating conduct occurring within the territory of another state.
Certainly the prosecuting state would have no jurisdiction if no state exported
the price-fixed goods, and modern cases applying the effects doctrine suggest
that the independent conduct of third parties in exporting to the regulating state
breaks the essential "directness," if not "foreseeability," of the effect. Under
this interpretation, the effects doctrine as constrained by international law is
congruent to the implementation doctrine.
On the other hand, if the principles of international law are more loosely
interpreted, they quickly cease to remain binding constraints. The principle of
comity, for example, has never been held to require deference to foreign
interests that are contrary to a fundamental policy of the regulating state.74
Where the principles are too ambiguous to provide meaningful guidance, a
promise to adhere to international law is of little use either as a means of
distinguishing the Community from the United States or as a guide to situations
in which jurisdiction can be exercised.
I suspect Brittan would resolve this dilemma by agreeing that the constrain-
ing principles of international law are indeed ambiguous, permitting jurisdiction
beyond the economic entity, implied presence, and implementation doctrines
73. Case 89/85, A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193,5226, 4 C.M.L.R. 901,
931 (1988).
74. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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but not providing the effects doctrine with unfettered reach. If the principles
are ambiguous, however, in what Sense are they binding? Brittan might
respond that they are binding in a political sense, which brings us to the final
leg of his argument. Extraterritorial jurisdiction in competition matters,
regardless of the legal rubric under which it is claimed, ultimately presents a
political question: When is it best to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in an
effort to restore competition to the Community, and when is it best to refrain
from exercising jurisdiction because of the hostile reaction of foreign states
in the community of nations?
Brittan implicitly suggests that the Commission, as the executive arm of
the Community, is in the best position to make this decision in the Com-
munity's interest. Brittan notes that the Commission scrupulously abides by
the recommendations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and other international bodies, and consistently informs
and consults with foreign authorities about enforcement activities that may
impinge on their interests. Brittan believes, and it is unquestionably true, that
the Commission enjoys significant goodwill throughout the world in its antitrust
enforcement endeavors. The natural but unstated implication is that the effects
doctrine, interpreted flexibly in the first instance by a responsible and political-
ly sensitive Commission, will best serve the interests of the Community.
The point is a good one. If the economic entity, implied presence, and
implementation doctrines do not reach far enough and the Court eventually
recognizes the effects doctrine, the Commission as an institution should have
the proper incentives to use discretion and act in the Community's overall best
interests in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. In antitrust matters, the
Commission assesses liability or imposes fines by decision, a procedure that
requires a majority vote of the seventeen-member body. As Brittan notes, not
only does he cast his vote as a commissioner in a competition case, but so does
his fellow commissioner who is responsible for the Community's external
relations. Brittan could have added that two commissioners traditionally of
British nationality would also be casting their vote on any decision that relies
on the effects doctrine, and, although these commissioners do not "represent"
the United Kingdom on the Commission, their background is likely to predis-
pose them to caution in applying the doctrine. To the extent the Commission
seeks to proceed with broad agreement among its members rather than minimal
winning coalitions, it is likely to be sensitive to the international implications
of its use of the effects doctrine in any given case. Certainly the Commission's
efforts to date, including the Dyestuffs, Aluminum Imports, and Wood Pulp
cases and its reluctance to pursue discovery outside the Community, suggest
that the Commission will be sensitive to the international implications of its
actions and will exercise restraint in applying the effects doctrine.
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By contrast, the institutional situation in the United States has not encour-
aged great sensitivity in the use of the effects doctrine. Within the federal
government, the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) in charge of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice can initiate prosecutions on his or her
own authority, and AAGs, given their narrow portfolio, tend to emphasize
U.S. competition' policy interests. Over the years the Justice Department has
shown little hesitation in opening grand juries or civil investigations targeted
at foreign business conduct and in aggressively pursuing discovery abroad. Of
course, the Justice Department often consults with the Department of State on
the foreign implications of U.S. antitrust actions. This, however, is too
frequently a matter of courtesy rather than an effort to obtain meaningful
advice. Conversely, the State Department often does not contribute usefully
even when asked. The State Department does not usually place the internation-
al consequences of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction high on the list
of foreign policy concerns, and consequently only infrequently gives significant
analysis or high-level attention to such matters, even when asked for its view
by the Justice Department.7' Nor does the State Department often concern
itself with the domestic competition effects of extraterritorial conduct. The
State Department apparently knew, for example, about the existence of the
uranium cartel but never informed the Justice Department, and when the
Justice Department did open its grand jury investigation the State Department
sought to have it terminated.76 Similar if not greater problems confront deci-
sionmaking in the Federal Trade Commission, which has concurrent authority
to enforce the federal antitrust laws but is an independent agency outside the
executive branch. The courts add another level of complexity to the U.S.
institutional environment. Because the courts are independent of the executive
branch, a court might pay little heed to the opinion of the Justice or State
Departments. Therefore, if a case is before a court (brought, for example, by
a private party like Westinghouse), it might elect to exercise jurisdiction under
the effects doctrine.'7
75. As with every general tendency, there are exceptions. The State Department was actively involved
in President Reagan's decision in 1984 to terminate a Justice Department grand jury investigation which
sought evidence of an alleged predatory pricing conspiracy among trans-Atlantic airlines to drive Sir Freddie
Laker's discount "Skytrain" out of business. The State Department sought to foreclose the British Govern-
ment's reaction to the Justice Department's assertion of jurisdiction to target an investigation in part at the
conduct of U.K. airlines outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. See President Reagan Halts
GrandJury Investigation of UK-USAir Travel, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1191, at 929 (Nov.
22, 1984).
76. See Warren Pengilley, Extraterritorial Effects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Legisla-
tion:A View from 'Down Under, 16 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 833, 855 (1983).
77. Inln re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), the State Department encouraged
several governments, including that of the United Kingdom, to appear as amici on the question of
jurisdiction. In affirming the default judgment for lack of appearance by the foreign defendants, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed shock that "the governments of the defaulters have subservient-
ly presented... their case against the exercise ofjurisdiction." Id. at 1255-56.
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Notwithstanding the comparative advantage the Commission might have
over the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies, it must be remembered that the
Commission is not the only institution enforcing the Community's competition
laws. Many of the most significant efforts in the United States to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction have been made in cases brought by private plain-
tiffs. While the role of private plaintiffs in the enforcement of Community law
has not been substantial in the past, several states, as well as the Commission
itself, now advocate greater private-party participation given the Community's
limited enforcement resources. It is well settled that private parties are entitled
to use Articles 85 and 86 as defenses in contract actions in national courts,78
and the courts of several member states have accepted the principle that private
parties may obtain money damages or injunctions in national court proceedings
for breaches of these provisions.79 With increased enforcement by private
parties or, perhaps more significantly, by national antitrust enforcement
authorities, the Commission will no longer exclusively determine the circum-
stances in which to invoke the effects doctrine. 0
Consolidated Gold Fields' antitrust defense against a hostile takeover by
Minorco illustrates the problem, albeit in a U.S. setting.81 In October 1988,
Minorco, S.A., a Luxembourg corporation whose principal shareholders
include Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated
Mines Limited (also a South African company), and the Oppenheimer family
commenced a hostile tender offer for Consolidated Gold Fields PLC (Cons-
Gold), a British corporation. The group made its offer in the United Kingdom,
and explicitly disallowed the applicability of the offer in the United States.
Minorco and its shareholders are the largest producer of gold outside the
former Soviet Union. ConsGold is the second largest gold producer in this
market. ConsGold and Newmont Mining Corporation, its forty-nine percent
subsidiary and the largest gold producer in the United States, filed suit in
federal district court in the Southern District of New York. The complaint
charged that the acquisition of ConsGold by Minorco threatened competition
in the free-world gold market in violation of U.S. antitrust laws, and it sought
a preliminary injunction to block the consummation of the tender offer in the
United Kingdom. Although neither the Department of Justice nor the Federal
Trade Commission objected to the acquisition,,the district court in ConsGold's
78. See, e.g., Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51.
79. See, e.g., Union de Remorquage et de Sauvetage v. Schelde Sleepvaartbedrijf, 4 C.M.L.R. 251
(BeIg. 1965); Garden Cottage Foods, Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., 1984 App. Cas. 130 (1983) (appeal taken
from C.A.).
80. One solution to this problem, of course, is to permit only the Commission to employ the effects
doctrine, but Brittan maintains that the same rules of jurisdiction should apply regardless of which plaintiff
initiates the action. COMP-TITON POLICy, supra note 1, at 3.
81. Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'g in relevant
part 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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private action entered the requested preliminary injunction. When tht- Second
Circuit affirmed, Minorco's tender offer abroad became impracticable to
continue and was withdrawn. The foreign business community was outraged
by the interference of a U.S. court in what they saw as a strictly non-U.S.
transaction. The U.S. antitrust authorities were wholly uninvolved in the
private action, and their views toward the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion (whatever they may have been) were irrelevant to the result.
In sum, Brittan's argument that the European Court of Justice should
explicitly embrace the effects doctrine is not compelling. Even if the Commu-
nity enabling acts permit recognition of the doctrine, the Community has no
apparent public policy need to expand its jurisdiction beyond what it already
asserts under the Dyestuffs economic entity doctrine, the Bguelin/Aluminum
Imports implied presence doctrine, and the Wood Pulp implementation doc-
trine. The explicit adoption of the effects doctrine is likely to involve the
Community in a politically charged debate, undermine the Community's
standing in a significant part of the international community, and diminish the
goodwill of Community institutions in the minds of some member states. The
consequences will not be forestalled by the Community's commitment to
international law in its exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the effects
doctrine, since international law on the subject is too ambiguous to provide
politically adequate binding constraints. Nor are the good intentions of the
Commission likely to save the day. Even if the Commission exercises the
utmost restraint, it will not be able to control the conduct of national antitrust
authorities and private plaintiffs, who may be expected to avail themselves of
jurisdiction accorded by the effects doctrine for their own purposes. The
jurisdiction doctrines already recognized by the Court are adequate to the task
of protecting Community interests, competition and otherwise. It is unneces-
sary, if not counterproductive, for the Community to embrace the effects
doctrine.
III. THE "DoMESTIC POLICY" OF COMMUNITY COMPETITION LAW
In December 1989, the Council adopted Council Regulation 4064/89 on
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, more commonly known as
the "Merger Regulation," to enter into force on September 21, 1990.82 The
Merger Regulation introduces a comprehensive merger control law into the
Community for the first time in over thirty years of Community existence. The
82. Merger Regulation, supra note 3. Commission Regulation 2367/90, 1990 O.J. (L 219) 5, provides
the implementing details for premerger notification, time limits, and hearings under the Merger Regulation.
For other implementing details, see Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations,
1990 O.J. (C 203) 5; Commission Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Joint Operations, 1990
o.J. (C 203) 10.
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Merger Regulation is designed to be the exclusive Community-wide law
governing concentrations (as mergers, acquisitions, and certain joint ventures
are known in Community law) that meet its coverage thresholds, although
smaller concentrations of stock or assets where control is not transferred or
consolidated remain to some extent subject to Articles 85 and 86 as well as
to the individual merger control laws of member states.
The second half of Brittan's Lauterpacht Lectures looks at the new merger
law, providing both a short history of the development of the Merger Regula-
tion and a discussion of some issues of the regulation's interpretation and
administration. The lecture, given in February 1990, was closely scrutinized
for indications of how the Commission would enforce the regulation. Today
there are numerous explanations of the Merger Regulation that surpass in detail
what Brittan could cover in thirty-three pages, and that also have the advantage
of observing the Commission make actual decisions regarding its enforce-
ment." Brittan's lecture remains important, however, as an authoritative
source short of a formal pronouncement as to the Commission's approach to
a regulation whose intricacies and cross-currents are legendary.
Significantly, throughout the lecture Brittan continues to "sell" the wisdom
of the Merger Regulation and to minimize the considerable differences among
the member states that impeded its adoption during almost two decades of
active Commission lobbying. Brittan's forward-looking perspective is natural
for a Community official largely responsible for the ultimate adoption of the
regulation and charged with the oversight responsibility for its implementation
by DG IV. But we should not turn away too quickly from the history of the
Merger Regulation. This history, together with the insights we can gain from
the Commission's merger enforcement activities in the roughly one and one-
half years that the regulation has been in force, tells us much about the diffi-
culties of fashioning a "domestic" competition policy in a Community whose
member states can have widely differing views about their economic self-
interest, competition policy goals, and the tension between Community compe-
tition law enforcement and national industrial policy.
In 1966, the Commission engaged a group of academics to study the
application of Community competition law to mergers and acquisitions. The
Commission concluded after considering their reports that concentrations could
be reached under Article 86 to the extent that a merger or acquisition could
be characterized as an abuse of a dominant position. The Commission further
83. See, e.g., 2 HAWK, supra note 37, at 909-64; RrrrER ET AL., supra note 66, at 327-451; J.
WILIAM ROWLEY & DONALD 1. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROcESS 3-126
(1991); Eleanor M. Fox, Merger Control in the EEC: An Analytical Assessment of the Standard for
Prohibition, in 1991 FoRDHAM CORPORATE LAW INT., EC AND U.S. COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
739 (forthcoming 1992); Angus K. Maciver, The First Year of Enforcement Under the EEC Merger
Regulation: A View from the Trenches, in 1991 FoRDHAM CORPORATE LAW INT., supra, at 772.
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concluded that combinations were not subject to review under Article 85,
which applies only to cartels and other concerted practices among firms that
remain independent of one another." The Commission's view on the applica-
tion of Article 86 was confirmed in 1973 by the European Court of Justice in
Continental Can, its first merger control case, where the Court held that the
extension of a preexisting dominant position by means of a merger between
an already dominant firm and a competing firm was an actionable abuse.85
Although the Court did not address Article 85, the notion that this provision
was inapplicable to concentrations soon became part of the received wisdom.
Continental Can provided much too narrow a basis for a complete program
of merger control."5 Not only did it leave a serious question about the ability
of Article 86 to reach the full range of anticompetitive mergers in the Commu-
nity, but the Commission clearly had no authority to require concentrations
to be notified in advance. As the experience of the United States had shown,
without premerger notification it is almost impossible to return competition to
the status quo ex ante after an anticompetitive merger has been closed. More-
over, thdre were doubts whether the Commission had the authority to order
interim relief to restrain a merger during an investigation, or to order divesti-
ture of all unlawful transactions that already had closed. Finally, Article 86
left transactions subject to the concurrent antitrust jurisdiction of the individual
member states, thereby threatening to produce a confused and inconsistent legal
environment in the Community.
Shortly after the Court's Continental Can decision, the Commission, at the
invitation of the member states, presented a draft merger control regulation
84. Interestingly, a majority of the academics participating in the study agreed that Article 85 should
apply to mergers by agreement so long as two legal entities remained after the closing (presumably even
if they came under common control), but not to purchases from third parties or stock exchanges. (This
partially echoes the practice in the United States of regarding anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions as
failing within the concerted action prohibitions of Sherman Act Section 1; see, e.g., Northern Securities
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)). The Commission disagreed, concluding 1) that Article 85(1)
was too severe on mergers, which were socially beneficial in more instances than restrictive practices; 2)
that the exemption conditions under Article 85(3) were too restrictive (especially the indispensability
requirement); 3) that due to their permanent nature, mergers could not be unwound like restrictive practices,
in effect negating any review of an Article 85(3) exemption; and 4) that the application of Article 85(1)
to mergers by agreement, but not to economically equivalent acquisitions from third parties, would lead
to unequal treatment. COMMISSION OF TBE EUROPEAN COMMuN1TIES, MEMORANDUM ON THE PROBLEM
OF MERGERS IN THE COMMON MARKET, COMETrIoN SERIES No. 3 (1966) pt. iI1, reprinted in RTrER,
supra note 66, at 873-76.
85. Case 6172, Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 1 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973).
86. Continental Can remains the only case in which the Court of Justice applied Article 86 to block
a merger. The Commission, however, has used Article 86 against a number of mergers, including the
British Airways/British Caledonian merger (where British Airways was obligated to give certain commit-
ments to the Commission as to the future conduct of the merged entity) and the consortium bid for Irish
Distillers (which was dropped when the Commission objected to it as an abuse of a dominant position by
the consortium).
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to the Council. 7 The proposal contained three principal features: coverage
thresholds, a premerger notification requirement, and a substantive competition
standard. The draft regulation covered horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
concentrations that eliminated a company's independence, whether or not such
concentrations involved a dominant firm within the meaning of Article 85,
provided that at least one of the enterprises involved was established within
the Community. Substantively, the regulation would have prohibited as incom-
patible with the Common Market any covered transaction whereby the under-
takings involved acquired the power or enhanced their ability to "hinder
effective competition." Otherwise prohibited concentrations, however, could
be exempted on an individual basis where the concentration was indispensable
to the attainment of some industrial, technological, social, or regional objective
to which the Community gave a higher priority. Significantly, the enabling
power for the draft regulation was drawn not only from the Council's authority
under Article 87 of the Treaty of Rome to promulgate regulations to implement
Articles 85 and 86, but also from the Council's authority under Article 235
to take "appropriate measures" necessary to achieve one of the Community's
stated objectives where the Treaty itself did not provide the requisite powers.
The use of Article 235 would give the regulation a legal status equivalent to
Articles 85 and 86. The regulation gave the Commission exclusive enforcement
authority, unlike Articles 85 and 86, for which member states share enforce-
ment authority.
Although the European Parliament approved the 1973 draft regulation with
some modifications,"8 the regulation encountered stiff resistance in the Coun-
cil, which could promulgate the new law only with a unanimous vote. This
resistance derived from a fundamental concern that decisions taken in individu-
al cases by the Community authorities could be at odds with the domestic
industrial, social, or regional policies of one or more of the member states.
The Community's failure to adopt a comprehensive merger control law in
the 1970s and early 1980s probably was not a serious deficiency, since almost
all European mergers and acquisitions occurred between firms within the same
country and would not be reached by a Community merger control law in any
event. In the late 1980s, however, four emerging developments generated
enormous political pressure for a comprehensive Community merger control
regime.
First, European business began a substantial restructuring through trans-
Community mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures. 9 The number of trans-
87. Draft Merger Regulation, 1973 O.J. (C 92) 1; see COMMISSION OF TE EURoPEAN COMMUNITIES,
TID REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLicY 28-31 (1974).
88. 1974 O.J. (C 23) 19.
89. The Commission conducts an ongoing study of concentration activity in the Community, and
publishes the results in annual competition reports. The statistics cited in this paragraph are drawn from
TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 13, at 223 tbl. 6, 224 tbl. 7; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
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Community mergers and acquisitions involving at least one of the Community's
one thousand largest firms rose from 65 in financial year 1985 to 315 in
financial year 1990. Indeed, in financial year 1989, the number of cross-border
industrial mergers and acquisitions exceeded the number of national transac-
tions for the first time. Joint ventures also increased. Second, several member
states, notably Germany and the United Kingdom, had developed their own
sophisticated merger control programs, and other member states were in the
process of creating such programs. Third, changes in both the applicability of
the existing treaty provisions to concentration and the Commission's announced
enforcementpolicies significantly expanded the Commission's ability to fashion
a merger control program without the need for additional enabling legisla-
tion." Finally, frustrated by the lack of progress, Commissioner Peter Suther-
land, Brittan's predecessor as the commissioner responsible for competition
matters, adopted an aggressive program to place mergers and acquisitions
under the scrutiny of Articles 85 and 86. 91
In 1988, momentum finally began to build for a merger regulation. The
European Parliament called for the Commission to end the thirteen-year
deadlock by withdrawing its earlier proposals to the Council and starting
afresh.' In response, the Commission asked the Council to adopt a political
position that would allow a merger regulation to go forward. After intensive
bilateral discussions with the member states, four principles emerged to guide
the drafting of a new proposal. First, merger control should apply to large-
scale mergers that have a "truly European dimension" in order to prevent both
the creation and enlargement of a dominant position. This principle acknowl-
edged an allocation of responsibility between the Community and the member
states. It placed responsibility for control of large-scale mergers on the Com-
munity and smaller-scale mergers on the member states. Second, the regulation
should include provisions for premerger notification and strict time limits for
Commission decisionmaking. Third, the regulation should permit otherwise
TIES, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLIcY 20 tbl. 3, 217 tbl. 1 (1987) [hereinafter SIXTEENTH
REPORT].
90. Most notably, in Philip Morris/Rothmans the EC Court of Justice, at the urging of the Commis-
sion, reversed the conventional wisdom and declared that Article 85 could apply in principle to mergers
and acquisitions in which one firm acquires a minority interest in another with the result that the firms
remain legally independent but can coordinate their commercial conduct so as to restrict or distort
competition. Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, British Am. Tobacco Co. v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487,
4 C.M.L.R. 24 (1987).
91. Following a complaint lodged by the Irish Distiller Group, for example, the Commission for the
first time intervened in a hostile takeover bid. In a controversial decision, it found that the joint bid by
Allied Lyons, Guinness, and Grand Metropolitan for Distillers infringed Article 85. This holding led the
consortium to drop its bid. See COMMISSION OF THE EuROPEAN COMMUNTrIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON
COMEwrioN POLICY 85 (1989).
92. Parliament, Resolution on the Fifteenth Report of the Commission of the European Communities
on Competition Policy pt. 29, EUR. PARL. Doc. A2-223/87, 1987 O.J. (C 13) 120, 122, reprinted in
SIXTEENTH REPORT, supra note 89, at 242, 245.
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prohibited mergers to proceed for reasons analogous to those indicated in
Article 85(3). This principle represented a critical compromise between those
states that wished the merger regulation to take into account industrial policy
considerations, and those states that desired a purely competition-based merger
control policy. Fourth, the regulation should ensure the participation of the
member states in the decisionmaking process.93 Many member states re-
mained skeptical of giving the Commission a free hand to apply the regulation,
even with all its compromises and safeguards, to mergers and acquisitions in
which several member states were likely to have significant national interests.
In April 1988, the Commission presented to the Council a new draft
merger regulation based on these principles.94 Although the member states
accepted in principle the need for a Community-wide merger law, no consen-
sus emerged on the thresholds of applicability, the surviving subject matter
jurisdiction of Articles 85 and 86, the substantive standard to be applied, or
the roles to be played by member state competition authorities. The 1988
proposal languished until 1989. That year, Brittan became the commissioner
responsible for competition matters and Jacques Delors of France became
President of the Commission. Under their leadership, Council Regulation
4064/89 on the control of concentration between undertakings was finally
adopted by the Council on December 21, 1989, and entered into force on
September 21, 1990.21 Although the Merger Regulation retains coverage
thresholds, a premerger notification requirement, and a substantive antitrust
standard, the regulation is a much diluted version of the Commission's original
proposal due to the compromises necessary to achieve passage.
Application of the regulation is limited to concentrations with a Community
dimension. The Community has always defined concentrations by reference
to a transfer or consolidation of control in at least one firm involved in the
transaction. For purposes of the Merger Regulation, a concentration exists
whenever 1) two or more previously independent firms merge into a single
entity, or 2) one or more undertakings acquire control of all or part of another
undertaking. 6 The test of "control" for a concentration is the existence of
"rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in combina-
tion... confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertak-
ing.,,97 Acquisitions that result in minority holdings typically will not be
deemed to be concentrations and will continue to be subject to scrutiny by the
Commission under Articles 85 and 86. In some circumstances, however,
93. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
51-52 (1988).
94. 1988 O.J. (C 130) 4.
95. Merger Regulation, supra note 3.
96. Id. art. 3(1).
97. L art. 3(3).
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control may be exercised through a minority interest. In Arjomari-
Prioux/Wiggins Teape Appleton, for example, the Commission found that the
acquisition by Arjomari of a thirty-nine percent stake in Wiggins Teape
transferred control, where the remaining shares were widely held (no other
shareholder held more than four percent), so that Arjomari could be expected
to exercise a decisive influence on its minority subsidiary.9"
In contrast to the Merger Regulation's unremarkable definition of concen-
tration, the boundaries of a "Community dimension" evoked sharp dispute
during negotiations. The regulation defines a concentration to have a "Commu-
nity dimension" whenever 1) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of
all the undertakings concerned exceeds five billion ECU, and 2) the aggregate
Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings con-
cerned is more than two hundred fifty million ECU, except where each
undertaking concerned in the transaction achieves more than two-thirds of its
aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same member state. 99
Even accounting for inflation, these "Community dimension" thresholds are
a substantial departure from the 1973 proposal to cover all concentrations
involving turnover of two hundred million ECU or more. As a result of the
higher thresholds, the Merger Regulation was expected to cover about fif-
ty transactions per year (a remarkably accurate prediction), as opposed to over
three hundred transactions predicted in the 1973 draft during a time when
merger activity generally was much lower. Moreover, given the high thresh-
olds, the Merger Regulation is likely to be applied most often to huge con-
glomerate transactions, which are much less likely to be anticompetitive as a
whole than narrower, strategic horizontal or vertical acquisitions." ° The
regulation requires a qualified majority of the Council to review the coverage
thresholds no later than the end of 1993. °10 In a statement accompanying the
adoption of the Merger Regulation, the Commission stated its view that the
worldwide turnover threshold should be lowered to two billion ECU, and has
indicated elsewhere that the Community turnover threshold should be lowered
to one hundred million ECU."~ If adopted, these new thresholds would
increase the number of reportable transactions at present levels of merger
activity to somewhere between two hundred fifty and three hundred per year,
98. Ajomari-Prioux/Wiggins Teape Appleton, notifiedNov. 13, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 285) 18, cleared
Dec. 10, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 321) 16; see also Renault/Volvo, notfied Oct. 4, 1990, 1990 0.1. (C 254)
3, cleared Nov. 6, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 281) 2 (analyzing control issues where Renault and Volvo acquired
reciprocal shareholdings of 45% in each other's truck and bus subsidiaries).
99. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 1(2).
100. Korah reports that roughly half of the gross Community product is produced in industries in
which there are no two firms with aggregate turnover of five billion ECU or more. VALENTINE KORAH,
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETrrION LAW AND PRACTICE 213 (4th ed. 1990).
101. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 1(3).
102. See Statements of the Commission and the Council Relating to the Merger Control Regulation,
4 C.M.L.R. 314 (1990), reprinted in RITTER Er AL., supra note 66, at 893.
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proportionally more of which should involve strategic horizontal acquisitions
likely to present significant competition concerns.
The importance of the coverage thresholds, of course, stems from their role
in dividing merger control responsibility between the Community and the
member states. If the coverage thresholds are satisfied and none of the excep-
tions discussed below applies, the concentration is within the exclusive purview
of the Commission (subject to review by the Court of First Instance and the
Court of Justice). 3 Member states have no jurisdiction to investigate or
prosecute such transactions under the regulation or to apply their national
antitrust legislation.' If the coverage thresholds are not satisfied, so that
the concentration lacks a Community dimension, member states are free to
employ their national legislation to examine concentrations.
The Merger Regulation also provides the exclusive standard of review for
notifiable transactions. 105 To ensure that the Sutherland program's aggressive
pursuit of notifiable mergers and acquisitions under Articles 85 and 86 would
not be revived alongside it, the Merger Regulation preempts use of Articles
85 and 86 to scrutinize covered transactions. 6 In addition, the Merger Reg-
ulation provides that Regulation 17, which gives the Commission its investiga-
tory powers and authority to impose fines to enforce Articles 85 and 86, does
not apply to concentrations generally, including those below the thresholds or
exempt from coverage."° This latter provision effectively renders the Com-
mission powerless to review concentrations not covered under the regulation,
although private parties and national antitrust enforcement authorities may still
apply Articles 85 and 86 to such concentrations in proceedings in national
courts.
10 8
The Merger Regulation provides two vehicles for member states to protect
their interests in local markets when threatened by a concentration with a
Community dimension. In a concession to the member states with developed
merger control policies, the regulation provides that if a member state informs
the Commission that a covered transaction threatens to create or strengthen a
dominant position and so impede competition in a distinct market within that
103. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 21(1).
104. Id. arts. 21(2), 22(1).
105. Id. art. 22(1)-(2).
106. Id. art. 22(1).
107. Id. art. 22(2).
108. Technically, the Commission could still proceed against excluded concentrations under Articles
85 or 86, pursuant to the enforcement authority conferred by Article 89. The Commission has explicitly
reserved its right to invoke that authority, although it has indicated that it does not intend to take action
with respect to concentrations with a worldwide turnover of less than two million ECU, or below a
minimum Community turnover level of one hundred million ECU. Statements of the Commission and the
Council Relating to the Merger Control Regulation, reprinted in RITrER ET AL., supra note 66, at 893,
897. In the event that the Commission did invoke Article 89, however, it would have no ability to require
information or to impose fines.
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member state, the Commission may refer the matter to that member state to
permit it to regulate the concentration under its national competition laws."°
This provision is known as the "German clause." It was included at the
insistence of Germany, which sought to preserve the jurisdiction of its Bundes-
kartellamt to investigate covered transactions in local markets threatened by
competition. To the extent the German clause has any force in practice, it
represents a significant departure from the "one-stop shop" principle (a single
merger control regime for the entire Community) upon which the Commission
relied so heavily when urging adoption of a merger control regulation. Brittan
finds this provision "politically necessary, but... narrowly circumscribed"
and suggests that it is likely to be applied only infrequently."' Moreover,
Brittan has stated that the German clause does not represent a breach of the
"one-stop shop" principle, since the Commission retains the power to decide
unilaterally whether the transaction is best reviewed at the Community level
or by the national antitrust authorities of the requesting member state. Thus,
the Commission can ensure that only one competition authority will review a
given covered transaction.' These sentiments not only represent a deviation
from the spirit of the compromise underlying the German clause, they also may
overstate the case, since the regulation permits a requesting member state to
appeal a denial of a referral to the Court of Justice."' It remains to be seen
how strongly member states will press for referrals. To date, the German
clause has been invoked-appropriately by Germany-in only one instance,
the Varta/Bosch automobile starter battery joint venture. 3 The Commission
initiated proceedings itself and did not refer the case to the German authorities,
a decision Germany did not appeal to the Court of Justice." 4
109. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 9. Member state requests must be made within three weeks
of receipt from the Commission of a copy of the notification. Id. art. 9(2). A request automatically extends
the waiting period from three weeks to six weeks. Id. art. 10(1). During this extended waiting period, the
Commission must either 1) concur that a distinct market and threat to competition is present and open
proceedings to investigate; 2) concur that a distinct market and threat to competition exists and refer the
matter to the requesting member state; or 3) disagree that a distinct market or threat to competition exists,
adopt a decision refusing to refer the matter to the requesting member state, and clear the transaction. Id.
art. 9(3). The Merger Regulation provides that Article 9 will be reviewed by the Council in 1994. Id. art.
9(10).
110. CoNEMPTIo POLICY, supra note 1, at 39-40.
111. Hugo Dixon & Peter Bruce, Phone Monopoly Battle Looming, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1991, at
2.
112. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 9(9).
113. Varta/Bosch, notified Feb. 25, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 55) 4, approved subject to conditions July
31, 1991, 1991 O.J. (L 320) 26.
114. The Commission ultimately found that Germany constituted a separate relevant market for starter
batteries, and that the joint venture's 44% share threatened to create or strengthen a dominant position and
impede competition in that market. The venture was approved only after Varta agreed to terminate its
license agreement with Delta/Mareg, the second largest competitor in the German replacement market for
starter batteries, and to terminate the overlapping membership of the supervisory boards of the two
companies. 1991 O.J. (L 320) 32-33.
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Conversely, to aid the smaller states without their own merger control
regimes, the so-called "Dutch clause" of the Merger Regulation provides that
a member state may request the Commission to investigate concentrations
below the coverage thresholds." 5 Under this provision, inserted at the re-
quest of the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium, the Commission may review such
non-covered concentrations under the regulation if it finds the transaction
creates or strengthens a dominant position and thereby impedes competition
within the territory of the concerned member state. The Dutch clause was
adopted as a compromise in lieu of the preference of the smaller member states
for a worldwide turnover threshold lower than five billion ECU. Significantly,
the Dutch clause works only in one direction. A member state can ask the
Commission to oppose a merger within its territory. However, companies
contemplating otherwise anticompetitive mergers may not proceed without
review solely by invoking the Dutch clause to claim that, since no member
state raised an objection, the Commission could not intervene. Brittan predicts
that the clause will be invoked infrequently,"1 6 and no member state has yet
asked that it be applied." 7
Premerger notification is required of all concentrations covered by the
Merger Regulation. The prescribed notification must be made not more than
one week after the agreement is signed, a public bid is announced, or a
controlling interest acquired, and not less than three weeks prior to clos-
ing."' Within one month of receiving the completed notification (six weeks
if a request is made under the German clause), the Commission must adopt
one of three decisions: 1) a decision that the notified transaction is not a
concentration with Community dimension and therefore not subject to the
Merger Regulation; 2) a decision that the transaction is a concentration with
Community dimension but raises no "serious doubts" (an undefined term) as
to its compatibility with the Common Market, thereby clearing the transaction;
or 3) a decision that the transaction is a concentration with a Community
dimension that raises "serious doubts" about its compatibility with the Common
Market, and requires proceedings to investigate further. 9 If the Commission
does initiate proceedings, it has four months (rather than nine under the 1973
115. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 22.
116. CoMPETrION POLICY, supra note 1, at 42.
117. The Merger Regulation provides that the Dutch clause will remain in effect only until the
thresholds are reviewed in 1994 by the Council. See Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 22(b).
118. Id. art. 4(1).
119. Id. art. 6(1). Unlike a "second request" under the U.S. Hart-Scatt-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988), a decision to open proceedings itself does not automatically prevent the
parties from closing the transaction. To prevent a closing, the Commission must adopt a separate decision
finding it necessary to suspend the concentration or order other interim relief to ensure the full effectiveness
of a final decision. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 7(2), (4). In the case of a public tender offer,
the Commission cannot suspend the closing if the bidder agrees not to exercise the voting rights of any
shares it might acquire and to maintain the fill value of its investment. Id. art. 7(3).
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proposal) to complete its work and render a decision as to the compatibility
of the transaction with the Common Market. 2 At the end of the four-month
period, the Commission must adopt by decision one of three alternatives
closing the proceedings: 1) approval of the transaction without conditions; 2)
approval of the transaction with conditions imposing obligations on the parties;
or 3) prohibition of the transaction as incompatible with the Common Mar-
ket.121
These time limits place considerable pressure on the Commission and
represent a substantial reduction of the time periods contained in the 1973
proposal. In its original proposal, the Commission sought three months for a
preliminary investigation; the Merger Regulation provides only four weeks.
Although this is comparable to the thirty-day initial waiting period under the
U.S. Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Antitrust Improvements Act," 2 the HSR
premerger notification form requires only limited (and often useless) informa-
tion, and U.S. antitrust authorities have virtually unfettered discretion in
opening formal investigations and demanding (through a so-called "second
request") additional documents and interrogatory responses. By contrast, Form
CO, the notification form the Commission prescribes, requires the parties
(subject to limitations negotiated in each case with the Merger Task Force) to
submit initially much the same information as the U.S. authorities require in
their standard second request. While this gives the Commission much more
information in the preliminary investigation period, the Commission can open
proceedings for further investigation only by a publicly announced, formal
decision delineating the nature of the Commission's "serious doubts" about the
transaction. From the perspective of the member states, this holds the Commis-
sion accountable to a degree absent in the preliminary decisionmaking under
U.S. law. It also permits, interested member states to prepare their case and
work within Community institutions to encourage the Commission to permit
or block a notified transaction. Finally, the short preliminary investigation
deadline ensures that mergers and acquisitions will not be impeded for months
merely because of bureaucratic wrangling and indecision, a frequent occur-
rence in non-merger investigations. Similar considerations led to the four-
month limit on formal proceedings under the Merger Regulation, when by
comparison second request investigations in the United States often take six
to nine months or more to complete. Although this difference is mitigated by
the fact that parties in a U.S. second request investigation must produce
materials which presumably would have been produced initially to the Commis-
sion upon submission of Form CO, the Merger Regulation's time periods
unquestionably are demanding.
120. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 10(3).
121. Id. art. 8(2)-(3).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
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The entire substantive prohibition of the Merger Regulation appears in
Article 2: "A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position
as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible
with the common market." 1"
This prohibition structures the substantive analysis into three parts: 1)
delineating the product and geographic dimensions of the relevant market(s)
in which the effect of the concentration is to be assessed; 2) determining
whether the concentration will create or strengthen a dominant position in the
relevant market; and 3) if so, determining whether this creation or strengthen-
ing of a dominant position will significantly impede effective competition in
the relevant market. In assessing these questions, the regulation requires the
Commission to consider: 1) the structure of the markets in which competition
may be affected and the actual or potential competition entailed in those
markets by firms both within and outside the Community; 2) the market
position of the parties; 3) their economic and financial power; 4) the alterna-
tives available to suppliers and customers in their access to supplies and
markets; 5) legal and other barriers to entry; 6) supply and demand trends in
the relevant markets; 7) the interests of intermediate and ultimate consumers;
and 8) the development of technical and economic progress "provided that it
is to the consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competi-
tion. "124 The preamble to the Merger Regulation indicates a presumption that
a concentration is compatible with the Common Market where the combined
share of the undertakings does not exceed twenty-five percent either in the
Common Market or in any substantial part of it."z
Although the Merger Regulation contains no guidance on market definition,
it appears the Commission will employ demand-side substitutability as the
primary consideration in determining product market boundaries. Form CO
defines a product market to be "all those products and/or services which are
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use. "126 Significantly,
the Commission appears increasingly willing to take into account supply-side
substitutability,127 which in recent years has come to dominate market defini-
tion in most U.S. antitrust investigations. Product market definition does not
123. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, art. 2(3).
124. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
125. Id. pmbl. 15.
126. Form CO § 5, Commission Regulation 2367/90, 1990 O.J. (L 219) 5, 15 (Annex 1).
127. See, e.g., Adrospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, notified May 13, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 128) 13,
blocked 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42 (considering but rejecting on facts supply-side substitutability in regional
turboprop aircraft); VIAG/Continental Can, notified Apr. 30, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 119) 13, cleared June
6, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 156) 10 (considering but rejecting on facts supply-side substitutability among glass,
plastic, and metal beverage containers).
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yet appear to pose a serious problem in EC merger antitrust analysis, perhaps
because of the willingness of the parties and the Merger Task Force to agree
on the product market boundaries in the process of negotiating data "waivers"
for the premerger notification report.
Geographic market definition is more hotly contested. Given the history
of industrial nationalism in the Community, the existence of a dominant
position is often more sensitive to the geographic dimensions of the relevant
market than to the product boundaries. Substantial disputes already have arisen
over whether a market should be national, Community-wide, or worldwide in
scope. In close cases, the Commission's natural incentive is to find national
markets. This will inhibit the creation of "national champions," which may not
be dominant if markets are broadly defined geographically, and encourage
cross-border mergers, which are likely to aid in the Community's integration.
As a result, geographic market definition could be an area of controversy not
only between the Commission and the merging parties, but also between the
Commission and individual member states wishing to strengthen their national
firms. 128
After determining the product and geographic dimensions of the relevant
market, the next step in the analysis is to assess whether the concentration will
create or strengthen a dominant position in that market. Although the Merger
Regulation does not define the term, the notion of dominance is employed in
Article 86. Cases interpreting Article 86 look to the ability of a firm "to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers
and ultimately of the consumers."129 Dominance, then, at least under Article
86, is a behavioral concept, whose existence in any given case depends on all
the factors that compel or constrain business behavior (including those listed
in Article 21 of the Merger Regulation) and is not defined merely by referenc-
es to structural market share thresholds. Nonetheless, a firm must be able to
achieve and sustain some significant market share in order to insulate itself
128. For examples of Commission findings on market boundaries, see, e.g., VIAG/Continental Can,
notified Apr. 30, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 119) 12, cleared June 6, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 156) 10 (market for
beveragecontainers in Germany, Benelux countries, and NorthernFrance); Magneti-Marel i/CEAC, notfied
Dec. 10, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 315) 14, approved subject to conditions May 29, 1991, 1991 0.3. (L 222)
38 (French market for batteries); A6rospatiale/MBB, notified Jan. 23, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 18) 4, cleared
Feb. 25, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 59) 13 (Community market for civilian helicopters); Mitsubishi/Union
Carbide, notified Jan. 4, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 7) 3, cleared Feb. 6, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 37) 11 (Community
market for flexible graphite, carbon electrodes, and graphite specialties); AT&T/NCR, notified Dec. 7,
1990, 1990 O.J. (C 310) 23, cleared Jan. 18, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 16) 20 (Community market for personal
and small multi-user computers); ICI/Trioxide, notified Nov. 26, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 300) 8, cleared Jan.
4, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 5) 7 (Community market for titanium pigments and related chemical products);
Promodes/Dirsa, notifiedNov. 15, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 290) 16, cleared Dec. 17, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 281)
2 (local metropolitan markets for food products); AMEV/AG, notified Oct. 19, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 268)
8, cleared Nov. 21, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 304) 27 (separate member state markets for insurance).
129. See, e.g., Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. A.G. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 520,
3 C.M.L.R. 211, 274 (1979).
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from competitive prices, and the Court of Justice has never found a firm with
a market share of less than forty percent to have a dominant position. The
Merger Regulation, however, consistent with past Commission pronounce-
ments, provides a "safe harbor" from dominance only up to twenty-five
percent,13° leaving open the possibility that firms with market shares of
twenty-five to forty percent will be dominant for merger control purposes.
If a concentration does create or strengthen a dominant position, the final
step in the liability analysis is to ascertain whether that dominant position
would significantly impede effective competition in the relevant market. The
factors to be taken into account are for the most part traditional competition
indicia. Significantly, there is no justification like that found in the 1973 draft
for permitting an otherwise anticompetitive concentration to proceed where the
transaction was found to be indispensable to the attainment of some industrial,
technological, social, or regional Community objective. The inclusion of
technical and economic progress, however, may allow assessment of industrial
policy considerations, and probably reflects an inability on the part of the
Council to resolve completely the differences between member states such as
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France that favor such considerations, and member
states such as the United Kingdom and Germany that favor a pure competition
approach to merger control. Furthermore, the Merger Regulation recognizes
that states may have legitimate interests in public security, plurality of media,
and prudential rules, and permits member states to apply national laws to
concentrations to protect these interests after notifying the Commission.
131
Finally, one of the recitals to the Merger Regulation, apparently inserted at
the insistence of Spain, refers to various goals of the Community in addition
to the preservation of competition, including the "strengthening [oi] ...
economic and social cohesion, "132 and "the achievement of the internal mar-
ket by 1992 and its further development." 33 This so-called "Spanish clause"
suggests that the Merger Regulation's interpretation should be informed by
these noncompetition goals, particularly when reviewing concentrations involv-
ing less-developed regions of the Community. While Brittan has emphasized
that the Merger Regulation will be interpreted to apply a strict competition
standard, 134 the exact operative notion of competition remains to be seen.
Even if the Commission does not pursue an industrial policy, it is likely that
it will weigh heavily Community integration goals as well as economic effi-
ciency when allocating resources to enforce the Merger Regulation.
130. Merger Regulation, supra note 3, pmbl. 15.
131. Id. art. 21(3).
132. Id. recital 13 (referring to EEC TREATY art. 130a).
133. Id. recital 2.
134. See, e.g., COMPETION PoLicY, supra note 1, at 35-36.
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The Merger Task Force is the organization responsible for merger review
within DG IV. The Task Force is composed of approximately forty-five
professionals, half of whom are seconded from the national competition
authorities of member states pursuant to an agreement reached at the time the
Merger Regulation was adopted. 3' The Commission's merger decision-
making procedures are more streamlined than those found in other areas of
competition policy. Decisions typically run about four or five pages in length,
compared to twenty or thirty in a case under Article 85 or Article 86, and this
shorter length mitigates the burden of translating decisions into the nine official
languages. Even with this streamlining, however, it appears the present Merger
Task Force is fully occupied with the approximately fifty reportable transac-
tions under the current thresholds. If the Commission successfully lowers the
reporting thresholds and increases the number of reportable transactions to
between two hundred fifty and three hundred per year, many of which likely
will be more complicated strategic horizonal acquisitions,' 36 the Merger Task
Force will have to be augmented substantially. With this augmentation, it may
be difficult to maintain the existing high levels of speed and quality in the
analysis of reportable transactions.
Although a year is too brief to draw any final conclusions, experience to
date indicates that the Merger Regulation is a workable regime of merger con-
trol for the Community. As expected, the Commission received about fifty
notifications during the first year of the Regulation's operation. Unlike earlier
drafts, which required the establishment of at least one of the undertakings in
the Community as a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, the Merger Regulation
contains no such requirement. A number of transactions outside the EC were
notified in the first year. These non-EC transactions included Mitsubishi/Union
Carbide,'37 Matsushita/MCA, 35 and AT&T/NCR (the first hostile takeover
covered by the Regulation). 39 Roughly half of the notified transactions were
concentrative joint ventures." In every case, the deadlines prescribed by
the Merger Regulation were met. With the exception of the Renault/Volvo
transaction' 41-ironicaUy, the first of the notifications-none of the transac-
tions appeared to present any substantial factual or analytical complexity.
135. TWENTITH REPORT, supra note 13, at 38-39.
136. See supra text accompanying note 100.
137. Notified Nov. 26, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 300) 8, cleared Jan. 4, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 5) 7.
138. Notified Dec. 3, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 307) 2, cleared Jan. 10, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 12) 15.
139. Notified Dec. 7, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 310) 23, cleared Jan. 18, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 16) 20.
EDS/SD-Scion was the second contested takeover notified to the Commission. EDS/SD-Scion, notified June
18, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 162) 11, cleared July 30, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 23) 44.
140. Joint ventures have presented the most serious questions of reportability under the Merger
Regulation. The regulation draws a distinction between "concentrative" joint ventures, which are subject
to the regulation, and "cooperative" joint ventures, which are outside of the regulation and are subject to
the provisions of Article 85.
141. Notified Oct. 4, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 254) 3, cleared Nov. 6, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 281) 2.
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Most of the notified transactions (including all non-EC transactions) were
approved during the initial one-month examination period, without the initiation
of proceedings for further investigation. A few transactions were declared not
to fall within the scope of the Regulation, primarily because the transactions
were deemed not to be concentrations. 42 As of the end of 1991, the Com-
mission had initiated proceedings in five cases. Following four-month investi-
gations in these cases, the Commission declared one compatible with the Com-
mon Market, 43 three compatible with the Common Market subject to condi-
tions or obligations,'" and one incompatible with the Common Market. 45
The Commission appears much more willing than the Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission to accept
commitments ("conditions") short of divestiture to alleviate antitrust concerns
in an otherwise anticompetitive transaction. To satisfy the federal antitrust
authorities in the United States, parties almost always must agree to divest the
entire business operations of either the acquiring or acquired firm in the
problematic market to a third party acceptable to the investigating agency. The
idea is that the third party will "step into the shoes" of the divesting firm, so
that after both the investigated transaction and the "fix" (as the curative
divestiture is known in the trade) are closed, the merged firm and the third
party will compete in the market in the same way as did the acquiring and
acquired firms prior to the merger. Only in rare cases will the U.S. authorities
accept something less, and in many cases even divestiture is not an adequate
solution for U.S. agencies to an anticompetitive merger or acquisition. In
contrast, the Commission appears willing to entertain non-divestiture solutions.
The Alcatel/Telettra transaction 46 provides a good example. Alcatel
sought to acquire control of Telettra, Fiat's telecommunications subsidiary. The
Commission opened proceedings due to concern that the acquisition would have
an anticompetitive impact in Spain in the market for telecommunications
transmission equipment. The two companies were direct competitors in Spain
and held a combined share of eighty percent of the telecommunications market,
and a combined eighty-three percent share in the market for microwave
equipment. Telefonica of Spain, the telecommunications company most directly
142. E.g., Baxter/Nestle/Salvia, notified Jan. 4, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 7) 3, cleared Feb. 6, 1991,
1991 O.J. (C 37) 11.
143. Tetra PakIAlfa Laval, notified Feb. 6, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 36) 15, cleared July 19, 1991, 1991
O.J. (L 290) 35.
144. Varta/Bosch, notified Feb. 25, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 55) 4, approved subject to conditions July
31, 1991, 1991 O.J. (L 320) 26; Magneti-Marelli/CEAC, notified Dec. 10, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 315) 14,
approved subject to conditions May 29, 1991, 1991 O.J. (L 222) 38; Alcatel/Telettra, notified Dec. 10,
1990, 1990 O.J. (C 315) 13, approved subject to conditions Apr. 12, 1991, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 48.
145. Adrospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, notified May 13, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 128) 13, blocked 1991
O.J. (L 334) 42.
146. Notified Dec. 10, 1990, 1990 O.J. (C 315) 13, approved subject to conditions Apr. 12, 1991,
1991 O.J. (L 122) 48.
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affected by the transaction, held twenty-one percent of Alcatel Standard
Electrica S.A. and ten percent of Telettra Espafia (the merging parties' respec-
tive supply subsidiaries in Spain), and raised no objection to the concentration.
Competitor-suppliers such as Siemens, however, complained that Telefonica's
minority shareholdings in the Alcatel and Telettra subsidiaries gave them a
privileged position and created a barrier to entry into the Spanish market. The
Commission permitted the acquisition to proceed when Alcatel agreed to buy
Telefonica's interest in the supplier-subsidiaries and Telefonica agreed to
pursue a diversified purchasing policy in the future. Given these assurances,
the Commission found that the threat of entry would keep the Spanish telecom-
munications equipment markets competitive (essentially an "ease of entry"
defense in the United States), and that the merger would not lead to a dominant
position that threatened to impede competition. 47 Based on similar facts in
a U.S. market and similar findings about the competitive impact of an unre-
structured transaction, U.S. antitrust agencies almost certainly would have
insisted on the divestiture of either Alcatel Standard Electrica S.A. or Telettra
Espafia had they the independent capacity to manufacture the equipment in
question, or would have attempted to block the deal if the subsidiaries lacked
this manufacturing capability.'
The only blocking decision entered by the Commission through the end of
1991 was in Adrospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland.149 A6rospatiale SNI and Al-
enia-Aerilalia e Senlenia SpA jointly sought to acquire the de Havilland
division from Boeing company. The Commission found that the market shares
of the companies in Europe and worldwide, and the structure of the industry,
would give the combined company an unassailably dominant position in the
world market for commuter aircraft. Following the Commission's decision
there were cries of outrage from Italy and France, and Martin Bangemann,
the EC commissioner with oversight responsibility for the internal market and
policy, staged a vigorous assault on the Commission's decision to delegate to
Brittan exclusive authority to initiate proceedings without any need to consult
other commissioners. Bangemann's effort was an explicit attempt to insert
industrial policy concerns into a process he found governed solely by competi-
tion considerations. Although the Commission rejected the Bangemann proposal
and renewed for another year the delegation of merger review authority to
Brittan, politics and political pressure are likely to remain part of the merger
control activity in the Community.
Given the widely divergent views of the member states towards merger
control generally and the role of the Commission in particular, we can now
147. The Commission used a similar *open competition" approach in the Varta/Bosch transaction.
148. The U.S. result also depends on the considerable skepticism of the Antitrust Division and the
FTC regarding the workability of the "ease of entry" defense.
149. Notified May 13, 1991, 1991 O.J. (C 128) 13, blocked 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42.
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see more clearly why Brittan in the Lauterpacht Lectures continued to "sell"
the Merger Regulation even after its promulgation. Although unanimously
adopted by the Council and considerably weaker than the original Commission
proposals, many in the Community were skeptical about the feasibility of the
Merger Regulation. The Commission had to prove it was up to the task of
reviewing notified mergers under extremely tight time constraints, particularly
given the voluminous amount of information accompanying the notifications,
the need to prepare decisions in nine official languages, the relatively small
professional staff of the Merger Task Force, and the complexities of bureau-
cratic control that historically accompany Commission decisionmaking in
competition matters. Moreover, there was apprehension over the ability of
business to collect and supply the information demanded by the premerger
notification form-much of which business regards as unnecessary-and the
ability of the Commission to keep this highly proprietary business material
confidential. Finally, there was concern over whether the Commission and the
member states could work in harmony in merger control and whether the
Commission would limit its analysis to competition or take other interests or
even national policies into account. These concerns now have largely abated.
The Commission has demonstrated to the satisfaction of most that the Merger
Regulation is workable and that the Commission can apply it fully and fairly
in a timely manner. Undoubtedly, the debate will continue over the proper
balance between traditional competition concerns over the efficient allocation
of resources and the industrial and social policy considerations of an open
economy. This debate, however, is fundamentally no different from the
ongoing discussion over the goals of the Sherman Act in the United States over
the last century. The key is that the concept of Community merger control and
national preemption has become the status quo and is no longer subject to
serious dispute. If the Commission can continue its existing levels of perfor-
mance as it is presented with greater numbers of analytically more complicated
transactions after the coverage thresholds are lowered in 1994, Brittan will no
longer have to cast himself in the role of a salesman.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW
A common theme in Brittan's two Lauterpacht Lectures is the need for
increased international cooperation and understanding in antitrust regulation.
As businesses and markets grow increasingly international in scope, more
jurisdictions will find themselves interested in the competitive implications of
a given transaction or market activity. As we have seen, the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the effects doctrine puts into sharp relief any
tensions that may be present among the policies of interested countries, but
these tensions equally can be illuminated by the use of the less expansive
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economic entity,. implied presence or implementation doctrines.15 Indeed,
in a world populated by transnational mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures,
international distribution arrangements, and multinational technology licenses,
antitrust regulation even under the strict territorial principle easily can generate
discord in the international community.
To begin a new era of international cooperation, Brittan used the Lauter-
pacht Lectures to call for a treaty between the United States and the Communi-
ty to provide for notification and consultation in matters of common interest,
the exchange of nonconfidential information, mutual assistance in investiga-
tions, best efforts-to cooperate in enforcement when interests coincide, and,
when interests clash, a means to designate-one party to undertake the investiga-
tion and any enforcement action and to require the other party to abstain."'
International agreements, while not common, are not new in antitrust
law." 2 The most important international agreement is the 1986 OECD Rec-
ommendation, 53 to which the twenty-four member nations subscribe. The
Recommendation urges that whenever an antitrust enforcement authority of a
member country undertakes an antitrust investigation that may affect important
interests of another member country, the investigating country should notify
(in advance if possible) these other countries, and while retaining full freedom
to act, solicit their views. Notification should be sufficiently detailed to permit
an initial evaluation by the notified country of the likelihood of any effects on
its interests, and should include the names of persons to be investigated, the
activities under investigation, and the character of the investigation. The
Recommendation further urges interested members, through consultations or
otherwise, to seek a mutually acceptable means of approaching the business
practice in question in light of respective national interests. If no satisfactory
solution can be devised, the Recommendation invites the parties to use the
good offices of the OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices with a view to nonbinding conciliation.
The United States also is a party to three bilateral antitrust agreements. The
agreement with Germany, signed in 1976, is the earliest of these agree-
ments.154 The German agreement, which codified existing informal practice,
was designed more to facilitate cooperation in investigations and antitrust
studies than to mitigate or reconcile conflicts of national interests. The agree-
ment provides for assistance in the collection of information relevant to an
150. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
151. COMiPmoN PoLicy, supra note 1, at 20-21.
152. See generally 1-A HAWK, supra note 37, at 736-45, 786-800.
153. Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation between Member
Countries on RestrictiveBusiness PracticesAffecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(86) 44 (May 21,
1986), reprinted in id. app. 35.
154. Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23,
1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,501.
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investigation, confidential treatment of exchanged information, cooperation on
concurrent enforcement activities, and consultation regarding investigations or
proceedings that might affect important interests of the other party. The
agreement also provides that, to the extent compatible with "domestic law,
security, public policy or other important national interests," the parties will
not interfere with investigations carried out by each other. 55 The German
agreement generally memorializes the close ties between the two countries on
antitrust matters and does not impose restrictions on investigatory or prosecuto-
rial discretion.
The bilateral agreements with Australia'56 and Canada, 157 on the other
hand, evolved in the wake of the uranium cartel proceedings and are designed
to give fair warning to those countries of U.S. antitrust enforcement activities
that may affect their interests. The Australian agreement, Signed in 1982,
provides that each party will give prior notice (to the extent possible) to the
other party before commencing any criminal or civil investigation that may
have implications for the notified party's interests, obligates the notifying party
to consult at the request of the notified party, and requires both parties to "seek
earnestly to avoid a possible conflict... and for that purpose to give due
regard to each other's sovereignty and to considerations of comity. "' Signif-
icantly, notifications are to be made through diplomatic channels, not through
the national antitrust enforcement agencies. The agreement with Canada,
signed in 1984, is much like the Australian agreement, only more detailed with
respect to the situations requiring notification, the timing of notification, and
the method of delivery of the notification.
U.S. officials warmly greeted Brittan's invitation to negotiate a U.S.-EC
antitrust agreement. A cooperation agreement reached the signers on September
23, 1991, demonstrating amazing dispatch for international negotiations.' 59
The agreement, a combination of the OECD and German models, is by far the
most detailed of antitrust cooperation agreements to which the United States
is a party. It provides for advance notification whenever enforcement activities
of one party may affect important interests of the other party. In particular,
notification is required under the following circumstances: 1) whenever
enforcement actions are directed at conduct carried out in significant part
within the other's territory, at a merger or acquisition in which at least one
155. Id. art. 4(1).
156. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl., T.I.A.S.
No. 10,365, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,502.
157. Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect
to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,503.
158. Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, supra note 156, art. 2(5).
159. AgreementRegardingtheApplicationofCompetition Laws, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-EC, repinted
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,504.
Yale Journal of International Law
of the firms in the transaction is incorporated under the laws of the other party
or one of its member states, or at activities believed to have been required or
encouraged by the other party; or 2) when enforcement actions involve reme-
dies that would, in significant respects, require or prohibit conduct in the other
party's territory. 1" The agreement also requires the competition authorities
of each party to render assistance to investigations and other proceedings
conducted by the other's competition authorities, at least to the extent compati-
ble with domestic laws and interests and consistent with reasonably available
resources.161 When one party learns of anticompetitive activities that may
warrant enforcement action by the other party's antitrust authorities, the
knowledgeable party must inform the other party of those activities. 162 More-
over, when one party believes it is being adversely affected by anticompetitive
activities carried out in the other party's territory, the harmed party may
request the other party's competition authorities to initiate appropriate enforce-
ment action." This introduces for the first time the notion of "positive comi-
ty" in international antitrust enforcement, a theme stressed by both U.S. and
EC officials at the signing of the agreement.
Significantly but not surprisingly, the agreement does not provide for any
allocation of enforcement authority over matters in which both the United
States and the Community have concurrent jurisdiction. Brittan, a wise and
worldly politician, almost surely realized how impracticable his proposal was
for the United States (if not for the Commission) in this regard, and rather
offered it as an opening gambit to push the United States toward cooperation
as far as possible. In any event, Brittan achieved an agreement requiring that:
[E]ach Party will seek, at all stages of its enforcement activities, to take into
account the important interests of the other Party in decisions as to whether or not
to initiate an investigation or proceeding, the scope of an investigation or proceed-
ing, the nature of the remedies or penalties sought .... 11
The Agreement requires each party to consult at the other party's request in
an effort to avoid conflicts arising from enforcement activities. 165 The agree-
ment also recognizes that the potential impact of enforcement activities on the
other party's interests generally increases as a matter proceeds from investiga-
tion to prosecution to relief, thereby suggesting that continuing and perhaps
increasing consultations may be in order as a matter goes forward. 166 Finally,
the agreement contains an extensive list of factors for consideration in accom-
modating each others' interests. These factors include "[t]he relative signifi-
160. Id. art. H(2).
161. Id. art. IV(1).
162. Id. art. I1(3).
163. Id. art. V(2).
164. Id. art. VI.
165. Id. art. VIIi().
166. Id. art. VI(2).
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cance to the anticompetitive activities involved of conduct within the enforcing
Party's territory as compared to conduct within the other Party's territory,"
and "[tihe presence or absence of a purpose on the part of those engaged in
the anticompetitive activities to affect consumers, suppliers, or competitors
within the enforcing Party's territory."167
These factors echo the type of considerations taken into account in a comity
or jurisdictional rule of reason analysis, and to that extent are not remarkable.
What is significant is that the United States and the Commission, two forceful
proponents of the effects doctrine, have committed to each other to consult and
consider these factors before taking enforcement action.
The U.S.-EC antitrust agreement is another major competition policy
victory for Brittan and for the Community. With its comprehensive consultative
obligations, the agreement ensures that the Community will be able to join with
the United States, and not be shunted aside, in the consideration of the major
business transactions and activities with implications for both sides of the
Atlantic. Indeed, the agreement makes the Commission the natural European
vehicle for most consultations with the United States, and to this extent permits
DG IV to trump Germany's Bundeskartellamt and Britain's Monopolies and
Mergers Commission in dealing with the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission. The agreement also provides an excellent model for the
Community in negotiating future antitrust cooperation agreements with other
international antitrust enforcement powers. Finally, the agreement mitigates
the obtrusiveness of the United States into business activities within the Com-
munity. To the extent consultation and openness aid understanding and encour-
age reconciliation of diverse national interests in competition matters, the
agreement should help the Community and its member states to rein in the
United States in its use of the effects doctrine in situations which threaten
European interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Brittan's Lauterpacht Lectures mark a milestone in EC competition policy.
Regardless of whether the Court of Justice accepts Brittan's invitation to
recognize the effects doctrine as the law of the Community, the ability of the
Community to protect its.interests by asserting jurisdiction over extraterritorial
anticompetitive activities is ensured in all significant cases by the now-estab-
lished economic entity, implied presence and implementation doctrines.
Brittan's jurisdiction lecture, if nothing else, puts the international community
on notice that the Commission will use the tools at its disposal during his
tenure to pursue an increasingly aggressive foreign competition policy. Domes-
167. Id. art. VI(3).
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tically, nothing reveals the internal tensions within competition policy as
clearly as the fashioning of a new merger control law. The Community lacked
any merger control program for the first thirty-two years of its existence, and
the tortured debate and stalemate that resulted for sixteen of those years in the
wake of the Commission's first merger control proposal augured against a
resolution. The successful adoption and implementation of the Merger Regula-
tion, with Brittan as its principal architect, demonstrates that the Community
can fashion a coherent and politically tractable domestic competition policy
despite the widely divergent views of its member states. The signing in Sep-
tember 1991 of the U.S.-EC antitrust cooperation agreement caps the competi-
tion policy accomplishments of Brittan and the Commission to date, and
symbolizes the emergence of the Community as a leading competition policy
force in the world. EC competition policy has truly come of age.
